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This report summarizes a study carried out on U.S.
Government Agencies Ship Acquisition processes. The
focus of the study includes identification and analysis
of the various lessons learned mechanisms with feedback
loops used in ship acquisition processes. Key
acquisition lessons learned mechanisms with feedback
loops are discussed, including: internal feedback within
the ship acquisition organization, upper level management
feedback, user feedback, formal training feedback,
research and development feedback, industry feedback, and
other feedback. Recommendations are given concerning
areas in which feedback loops are incomplete or lacking.
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1 . 1 HlS.LQ.L^l^a.S.ke.LQ.]i.R^
U.S. government agencies procurement processes are large,
complex, and difficult to manage. U.S. Government procurement
is the largest business enterprise in the world affecting the
security, industrial base, and economic condition of our
nation. Annual purchases by DOD alone total almost $170
billion [9]. (Numbers in brackets refer to references listed
inthisstudy.)
With the single exception of rocket and spacecraft
acquisitions, ship acquisitions are the highest cost and most
complex acquisitions U.S. Government agencies undertake. Many
factors influence the level of complexity for a given ship
acquisition program. Between the Navy and the Coast Guard,
government agencies acquire a wide variety of ships, ranging
from sophisticated submarines and nuclear aircraft carriers to
much smaller auxiliary and patrol vessels.
Ships require many years to design and build after a
decision is made to proceed with a particular design. The
process of defining the ship to be built requires up to five
years and is heavily influenced by the design requirements of
the combat systems to be included. Once built, ships
-8-

typically have a useful operational life of 30 years or more,
during which they may be upgraded from time to time with
improved combat systems or new capabilities reflecting
technological advances.
The process of weapons acquisition in general, i eluding
ship acquisitions, has been the subject of considerable study
over the years. Typical criticism of DOD has focused on the
acquisition resulting in ships that do not perform as
intended, cost too much, and take too long to acquire.
Examples of recent studies include the Naval Ship Procurement
Process Study (Department of the Navy) following the huge
shipbuilder claims generated in the late 1970's, and more
recently the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management (Packard Commission).
Lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops complete
the path for the many internal and external influences of the
ship acquisition process. A recent U.S. Coast Guard study
[14] indicated that establishing a 1 essons- 1 earned mechanism
with feedback loops was a critical success factor for the
Office of Acquisition. This study attempts to serve as an
early step in obtaining this goal.
A three-phase systems approach was used in this study to
examine and analyze lesson learned mechanisms with feedback
loops. These .nree phases are:
^




3. Pec ommend ed lessons learned mechanisms with feedback
loops .
In the initial phase a review was made of written
material relating to government procedures in U.S. Government
agencies for acquiring vessels, aircraft and other major
weapon systems. Particular attention was given to how the
lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops affected the
acquisition processes. In phase two, interviews were
conducted with a representative sample of personnel from
program/project offices, supporting functional codes, and
review and appraisal organizations to validate key events
selected in phase one, identify those areas where actual
practice differs from that specified in written procedures,
identify informal lessons learned mechanisms with feedback
loops, and identify locations in the acquisition process where
lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops are lacking.
In phase three, the data collected were assessed and
recommended lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops for
ship acquisition processes were developed.
1 . 2 Silid-X fikj££til£5.
The objectives of this study are:
To examine and analyze lessons learned mechanisms with
feedback loops in ship acquisition processes used by U.S.
Government agencies.
To examine and analyze lessons learned mechanisms with





(aircraft, missiles, etc.) used by U.S. Govern in ent
agencies which could be useful in ship acquisition
p roc esses .
To determine where lessons learned mechanisms with
feedback loops are lacking in major acquisition processes
used by government agencies.
To provide new teaching materials for U.S. Coast Guard
and U.S. Navy officers studying ship acquisition at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Furthermore, the study is intended as an aid to federal
agencies in m, aking decisions regarding ship acquisition
lessons learned mechanisms and feedback loops. At the present
time, there is a tightening of budgets that requires that each
dollar be spent wisely. In addition, the media has managed to
get plenty of mileage out of stories of U.S. Government
acquisition attempts that have ended in cost overruns or
deliveries behind schedule. Consequently, it is imiportant
that all government agencies learn from their mistakes in the
acquisition process relating to major expenditures such as
ships .
In summary, identify the key lessons learned mechanisms
and feedback loops that successful ship acquisition strategies
requ ire .
1.3 Stuix S£.£j2.£
The scope of the study is generic in nature. The study
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does not dwell on specific ship acquisition regulations,
directives, instructions, or terminology within a particular
agency. Rather than examing a specific acquisition process,
the study focuses on key parameters in alternative strategies.
Specific ship acquisition terminology used will be defined in
each case. The following ship types were deliberately




These ship types are considered rather unique regarding
today's marketplace situation in the U.S. shipbuilding
industry. The research is considered particularly applicable
to the acquisition of Navy and Coast Guard conventially
powered surface combatant ships and less complex commercial
types hips.
The analysis methods employed in conducting the study
included a review of existing major government system
acquisition literature, interviews with knowledgeable ship
acquisition professionals in the Navy, Coast Guard, academia
and industry, and interviews with knowledgeable aircraft
acquisition professionals in the Navy, Army, Air Force and
academia .
Literature reviews included the DIALOG Ocean Abstracts,
Defense Systems Management College Publications, Government
Accounting Office, Department of Defense and Navy
-12-

Instructions, and National Technical Information Service
automatic databases. A standard set of questions were asked
in the interviews to identify acquisition lessons learned
mechanisms with feedback loops and their merits. A broad
range of acquisition professionals were interviewed to obtain
the input of actual acquisition experience. These interviews
were extremely valuable in the analysis of lessons learned
mechanisms with feedback loop strategies useful to the ship
acquisition process.
Definitions as used in this study.
A2.a.lil£iti£CL £ai£gfilix - Navy designation for acquisition
programs - ACAT I (major); ACAT II, III, IV (Less than major).
AcfliiiSiilffiH LlQ.S.S.S.2. - The sequence of acquisition
activities starting from the agency's reconciliation of its
mission needs, with its capabilities, priorities and resources
and extending through the introduction of a system into
operational use and successful achievement of program
ob ject ives .
AxailaJiiliix - a measure of the degree to which an item
is in an operable and commitable state at the start of a
mission when the mission is called for at an unknown time.
£fill£.lillll£ll£.x - An acquisition strategy which combines
developmental test and evaluation with operational test and
evalua t ion
.
E.Ll.S.Q.^1^ S.U.&.S.S. - The overall degree of mission
-13-

accomplishment of a system used by representative personnel in
the context of the organization, doctrine, tactics, threat,
and environment in the planned employment of the system.
Lfillfiii fin l££t and. Exalliatian - The test and evaluation
which is conducted after the production decision to continue
and refine the estimates made during previous operational test
and evaluation to evaluate changes, and to evaluate the system
to insure that it continues to meet operational needs and
retain its effectiveness in a new environment or against a new
threat .
E.£.a5.i!i.liiix - The likelihood that a system design concept
can be produced using existing production technology while
simultaneously meeting quality, production rate, and cost
requ iremen ts .
£fii.£rilffi£ni Fiiiiai£li£ji Matanial L^ZHl - Material provided
by the government to a contractor in support of an item to be
delivered to the government.
Q.Q.:LS.r.D.mS.n.tL Eu.rni5.1l£ii Eiiy.i£ffl£iit (GFE) - Equipment provided
by the government to a contractor in support of an end item to
be delivered to the government.
£fiX£IlIlffi£Ili Elilllli£ll£.i InlfiCffiatifill LQ.E.11 - information
provided by the government to a contractor in support of an
end item to be delivered to the government.
Lil!£ £.X£.l£ £fi£i. - The sum total of the direct, indirect,
recurring, nonrecurring, and other related costs incurred or
estimated to be incurred, in the design, development,

production, operation, maintenance and support of a major
system over its anticipated useful life span.
MaialainatiliiLX - The ability of an item to be retained
in or restored to specified condition when maintenance is
performed by personnel having specified skill levels, using
prescribed procedures and resources, at each prescribed level
of maintenance and repair.
PufiiUfi-iklliiX - The relative ease of producing an item or
system. This is governed by the characteristics and features
of a design that enable economical fabricaton, assembly,
inspection, and testing using available production techniques.
££li2.kilii.X - The duration or probability of failure-free
performance under stated conditions.
Risk - The chance that some element of an acquisition
program produces an unintended result with an adverse effect





Siiic A£.fly.i£iiifiii Oiig.aaiiaiLi£n. - navsea for u.s. Navy,
Office of Acquisition for U.S. Coast Guard.
Sliii.akilii.X - The degree to which a system can be placed
satisfactorily in field use, with consideration being given to
availability, compatibility, transportability, reliability,
wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, human factors,







Suucariakilitx - The degree to which system design
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characteristics and planned logistics resources meet system
requirements
l£5.tal2.ilitx - A design characteristic which allows the
status (operable, inoperable, or degraded) of an item and the
location of any faults within the item to be determined in a
timely fashion.
iiCCfiC Ls.^S.1 Manag.£.m£lli. - Above NAVSEA or Office of
Acquisition in the chain of command.
Hj-^j. £fiX£.IlIlfll£Ili. Ag£Il£.X - A major organizational
subdivision of U.S. Government. For example: The Army, Navy
and Coast Guard are agencies of the U.S. Government.
The terms project and program are used interchangeably
throughout the report. Their context includes a ship
acquisition effort of major significance to government
agenc ies .
1.5 £a£i£. ZLS.mls.s.£.
A number of basic premises become apparent throughout
this study. These premises are considered central themes
throughout the report, and will be discussed repeatedly.
First, ship acquisitions are very complex processes with
the following types of characteristics:
The quality of the ship/system acquired is considered
essential .
A fair and reasonable price for the private contractor is
in the best interests of all parties.
-16-

Often third-party agents assist in design, sub-system
construction and even feedback efforts.
A major up front effort by the agency is very important.





Increasing sophistication and capability of potential
threats .
Changes in procurement statutes, regulations, and
policies .
Third, the basic premises of U.S. Government agencies
acquisition processes pertain as well to ship procurement as
they do to aircraft, missiles or other military systems;
however, there are a number of distinctions that are, to
varying degrees, particular to ships:
The size and complexity of combatant ships make them
unique among weapon systems.
The ffiultistep ship acquisition process introduces special
problems .
Shipbuilding industry differs markedly from other defense
industries .
Ship acquisition often requires concurrency in
development and production.
Ships are often produced in small numbers.
Ship construction times are very long.
-17-

Appendix E contains a Hi ore complete list of special
characteristics of ship acquisition as compared to other armed
forces major acquisitions.
Fourth, there are numerous lessons learned mechanisms
with feedback loops tnat affect ship acquisition processes. A
simple block diagram of basic feedback loops in a ship
acquisition process are shown in Figure 1 on page 20. This
block diagram is the basic outline of this study from which
each feedback loop will be examined.
1.6 0i:g.2.aiiaii^n Q.L R^£.q.lL
The ren.ainder of the report is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 - Internal feedback within the ship acquisition
organization - Discusses lessons learned mechanisms with
feedbacks loops internal within the ship acquisition
organization including; Matrix support feedback such as
logistics, contracts or technical; internal re v ie ws / b oa rd s
;
internal studies; informal feedback; and acquisition guides.
Chapter 3 - Upper Level Management Feedback - Discusses
lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops from upper-
level management including: Formal such as regulations,
directives or instructions; reviews such as milestones or
boards; stream^ lining; and direct involvement.
Chapter 4 - Sponsor/user feedback - Discusses lessons
learned mechanisms with feedback loops from operators
including: Reports, technical and operational; operational
testing and evaluation; inspections; and informal.
-18-

Chapter 5 - Formal Training Feedback - Discusses lessons
learned mechanisms with feedback loops from formal training
including: Schools, such as DSMC; acquisition professional
career paths, military and civilian; on-the-job training
efforts; and teaching methods.
Chapter 6 - Research and Development Feedback - Discusses
lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops from research
and development efforts including: Design; and developmental
test and evaluation.
Chapter 7 - Industry feedback - discusses lessons learned
mechanisms with feedback loops from industry including:
Claims; changes; contract incentives; design input; reports;
and industry organizations.
Chapter 8 - Other Feedback - Discusses lessons learned
mechanisms with feedback loops from other processes including:
External studies; GAO reports; news media; symposia; seminars;
academia; and Program Manager's Support System.
Chapter 9 - Conclusions - Outlines the major conclusions
of this study. Identifies incomplete or missing feedback
loops. The key issues concerning effective ship acquisition
lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops are presented.
Five appendices are included at the end of the report.
Appendix A lists the acquisition professionals interviewed as
part of this study. Appendix B contains a list of acronyms
used in this report. Appendix C contains a list of department
of defense and agency directives considered pertinent to the
-19-































ship acquisition process. Appendix D is a case study of the
U.S. Navy's MSH program. Appendix E contains special





INTERNAL FEEDBACK WITHIN THE SHIP ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION
Internal feedback within the ship acquisition
organization is defined as feedback within the NAVSEA
organization -- for the U.S. Navy and the Office of
Acquisition -- for the U.S. Coast Guard. Feedback from upper
level management above NAVSEA and the Office of Acquisition in
the chain of command and other feedback external to the ship
acquisition organization is discussed in Chapters 3 through 8.
This chapter will focus on the various feedback loops
internal to the ship acquisition organization. The ship
acquisition process will not be explained. See references 21
and 2k for an explanation of the ship acquisition process.
2.1 Mai.Ili2L
The principal responsibility of a program manager (PM) is
to procure ships from the shipbuilding industrial base that
satisfy the U.S. Government Agency's operational requirements.
Specific responsibilities of the PM include:
(a) Development -- Develop an organization and plan to
efficiently acquire the appropriate numbers and types of
ships to meet an U.S. Government Agency's requirements.
(b) Design -- Develop and review the adequacy of hull design,
machinery design, and full ship system integration.
-22-

(c) Construction -- Upon award of contract, the contractor
begins executing the shipbuilding effort in accordance
with the ship specifications, contract drawings, contract
guidance drawings and government or industry
specifications and standards. Throughout the
construction process, the PM remains responsible for the
successful completion of the ship within the established
constraints [17].
To assist the PM in meeting these responsibilities, U.S.
Government agencies use matrix management. The matrix
management operation is designed to give centralized control
of a large number of diverse functions with decentralized
management. In this matrix, the technical and administrative
experts are located in functional groups where they provide
direct support to numerous PM's as the need arises. These
matrix support groups are not dedicated to a single program
but divide their tim.e among all of the programs that require
attention at any given time.
Such organizational structure allows a relatively small
number of persons to manage large and complex problems on a
longterm, dedicated basis and provides prompt support for
these program personnel by specialists located in individual
functional groups. These specialists are exposed to numerous
state-of-the-art developments, and have the advantage of a
synergistic environment in which lessons learned on a program
can be applied toward solving problems on other programs.
-23-

Although actual matrix organizations vary with different
U.S. Government agencies, the basic matrix groups are as
follows :
Management — This matrix groups provides primarily
advice for business management. They assist with acquisition
strategy and plans including the acquisition plan, the test
and evaluation plan, and other administrative requirements.
Financial -- This matrix group prepares and submits
project budget request and cost estimates. They also provide
contract solicitation, negotiation, award and administrative
services .
Technical -- This matrix support group assists and/or
accomplishes the technical aspects of the program including
design, writing of specifications and other technical
requirements .
Integrated logistics -- An integrated logistics support
is a composite of all support disciplines required to ensure
effective and econoniical support of the ship. This matrix
groups provides and/or assists with maintenance plans,
manpower plans, supply support plans and other integrated
logistic support functions.
Construction — This matrix support group is the
representative for the U.S. Government agency at the
contractor's shipyard. This office administers the
shipbuilding contract for the U.S. Government agency.
Additionally, it coordinates the activities of representatives
-24-

of other govern niental elements at the shipyard and
participates in inspections required through the construction
phase. There is daily contact between the PM and this support
group once construction has started.
Other -- Depending upon the program, other groups also
provide matrix support. An example is the acquisition of sub-
systems and/or support equipment.
Interaction and feedback between the PM and matrix
support groups themselves is essential. Each matrix group's
actions can have an effect on other groups in the matrix. An
example of this is how integrated logistics support must be
involved with design support so that logistic support options
and trade-offs can be considered before the design is
f inali zed .
These matrix support groups also close the feedback loops
from groups external to the ship acquisition organization.
Examples of these feedback loops are:
For government in-house designs, industry inputs into the
design process provide valuable exchange of information
that benefits both industry and the U.S. Government
design effort.
User operational and technical reports on existing ship
systems assists matrix-technical groups in making
decisions on future ship systems.
These and other feedback loops external to the ship




There are numerous r e v ie ws /b oa rd s throughout the ship
acquisition process. Each of these re v ie ws / b oa rd s are a
lessons learned mechanism with feedback loop. This section
will discuss reviews/boards conducted within the ship
acquisition organization. Many of these r e v ie ws / b oa rd
s
conducted within the ship acquisition organization precede
reviews/boards conducted by upper level management and/or
sponsors/users. See Chapter 3 for an explanation of
reviews/boards conducted by upper level management. See
Chapter ^ for an explanation of reviews/ boards conducted by
sponsors/users .
Reviews/boards are conducted to provide objective
progress measurement and feedback on ship acquisition
programs. Satisfactory progress and validation of project
objectives are established as pre-requisites to entering the
next phase of the ship acquisition process.
Names of reviews/boards vary with different ship
acquisition organizations. Since no two ship acquisition
processes are the same, reviews/boards for each ship
acquisition process are also different. The basic breakdown





F inane ia 1
Log is t ics
Construction
Competition Ad voca te/ Acqu is it ion Streamlining
Business reviews/boards identify and check administrative
matters of the program. The purpose of these checks is to
identify any potential problem of the program early enough to
initiate changes if required. The overall procurement and
contracting approaches are checked. Plans for logistics and
testing are reviewed. Often business reviews/boards precede
upper level management reviews/boards. An example business
review/board is the Acquisition Review Board of the U.S. Navy.
The objective of technical reviews/boards is to ensure
the final ship will fulfill its requirements. The technical
review process is critical to reducing program risk. It
provides the discipline necessary to ensure timely
id en t i fie a t on of problems and their solutions. An example
technical review board is the Senior Design Review of the U.S.
Navy conducted at the end of the preliminary and contract
designs .
Several reviews of the financial activities of a program
are conducted each year. They serve as checks to the source
selection, cost estimating and provide current financial
status. An example financial review is the Ship Cost
Adjustment Review of the U.S. Navy.
Logistics r e V i e ws / b oa rd s ensure all supply, training,
-27-

manpower plans will meet the intended program objectives of
reliability, maintainability and availability. An example
logistics review /board is the Logistics Review Group of the
U.S. Navy.
Construction r e v i e w s / b o a r d s properly relate costs,
schedule and technical accomplishment. Periodic reviews are
held to insure the two major areas of concern, resource
expenditure and technical accomplishment, are meeting intended
goals. An example of a construction review/board is the
supervisor of shipbuilding periodic update m^eetings with the
contractor for the U.S. Navy.
Competition Ad v oc a t e / Ac qu i s i t i on Streamlining offices
review contract solicitations for enforcibility, technical
adequacy and operational suitability. Specifications and
standards are reviewed to ensure they are cost effective.
Additionally, the Competition Advocate/Acquisition
Streamlining offices review many of the acquisition process
plans prior to approval by a higher authority.
The independence and competence of the r e v i e we r s / b oa rd
members is essential. Design reviews must be performed by
technically competent personnel who are able to review design
analysis results and design maturity, and to assess the
technical risk of proceeding to the next phase of the
development process. A review conducted by someone not
technically competent is useless, and possibly dangerous.
-28-

2 . 3 lD.l£IlIlS.i_Stuii££.
NuiTierous studies internal to the ship acquisition
organization are conducted and/or sponsored by the ship
acquisition organization in an effort to provide guidance and
incor.. orate lessons learned from previous ship acquisition
programs .
The following are examples of some of these studies:
(a) A2.aiii£iiiSIl ££Xi£iii October 1987. A report by an
acquisition review team assessment of a recent shipbuilding
program to determine:
What undue risk was introduced?
Why the program had problems?
What NAVSEA could have done to avoid these problems?
What lessons learned were gained from the experience?
The results of the study produced eighteen specific
findings on the program studied [22].
(b) DDG-^1 Siiic A2.fly.isii.li^n Pi:fig.riaffi -- Ship Systems
Engineering Standards Implementation Lessons Learned, December
1987. The intent of this document is to provide visibility
and insight into the structure and methodologies which were
employed in bringing the naval warfare system's modularity
concept to fruition, and how it is being applied to real world
ship combat systems. The lesson learned objectives of this
document are to:




Relate the parallel effort required to incorporate ship
systems engineering.
Provide methods and lessons learned serving as a baseline
for application to future ship acquisition programs.
Serve as a beacon of success, thus providing
encouragement and incentive for future extension of ship
systems engineering standards to other functional
elements and ship types.
(c) Shis. Acaiiisiliiiii lls.n.s.e.s.uis.n.L R^sfiimaitiliiiss Mii^^iiin^
Manual* January 198^. This report has been created to serve
as a unique, dynamic instrument devoted to the principles of
contemporary ship acquisition managment. Specifically
tailored for a particular ship project office, the report
incorporates review comments from NAVSEA and OPNAV offices and
reflects "lessons learned" fronj previous acquisition programs
[20].
(d) SiiiE. Eiigill££riri£ in IAVSEA g^, September 1983. This
report assesses how ship engineering is currently being
performed, analyzes directives that help to implement and/or
constrain it's execution, and formulates a strategy for SEA 05
to conduct its business in a more effective and efficient
manne r
.
A strategy is set forth addressing the following:
SEA 05 in-house engineering capability.
Support from contractors and other Navy activities.
Life cycle management within SEA 05.
-30-

Relationships between SEA 05 and Ship Logistics
Managers/Ship Acquisition Project Managers.
Priorities within SEA 05 [19].
(e) ^]IlLq.q.s. SiliU AQ.fliijl£liiail ZzQ.S.S.S.S. Mal£l, July 1986. This
study develops a generic surface ship acquisition process
model from program initiation to contract award for the lead
ship. The national model depicts the principal events and
activities that occur in each phase and identifies the
documents that are prepared to support program execution and
review. A corollary objective is to identify those
instructions and regulations impacted by recent changes to the
Navy organization [21].
(f) IhS. Ifiar ZQ.Q.0 Plan, June 198^4. The purpose of this study
is to develop a road map pointing the way for the NAVSEA 05
organization of the future. Specifically:
To define the goal of where the NAVSEA 05 organization
should be by the year 2000.
To focus the mission of the NAVSEA 05 organization.
To plant the seeds of self-renewal in the NAVSEA 05
organization [18].
A more complete list of ship acquisition internal studies
that provide feedback on the ship acquisition process can be
found in the reference section of this study and the annotated
bibliography of reference 2^. The Navy's NAVSEA organization
and the Coast Guard's Office of Acquisition would also be able




A significant amount of the feedback loops which exist
within the ship acquisition organization are via informal
methods. Examples of these lessons learned mechanisms with
feedback loops are:
(a) PM to PM -- Often a manager in charge of many programs
will gather many PM's together for program updates. PM's can
share their experiences for problems discussed at these
meetings. Additionally, a wealth of information is exchanged
on a one-on-one basis, PM to PM.
(b) PM to individuals internal to the ship acquisition
organization -- The ship acquisition organization has many
individuals, both civilian and military, with vast experience
on many previous ship acquisition programs. Additionally,
discussions with personnel in field stations of the ship
acquisition organization provides valuable information and
improves liaison with these field stations.
(c) PM to Individuals external to the ship acquisition
organization -- Informal communication with individuals
external to the ship acquisition organization is another
source of information. Many of these individuals belong to
organizations discussed in Chapters 3 through 8.
2.5 Acfluiaiiiaa fiiiiis.
An excellent lessons learned mechanism with feedback loop
is the acquisition guide. The acquisition guide is a low
-32-

cost, small manpower operation that results in a wealth of
information on the acquisition process. Each reviewing
authority and matrix support group within the ship acquisition
organization puts together a brief one or two page summary on
what the key points to a successful acc,'i isi tion are from their
point of view. Included in this summary are past lessons
learned where other PK's have encountered difficulties. These
summaries are then grouped together by topics into one guide.
Combining the summaries into one guide is accomplished by one
person as a collateral duty.
The purpose of the Acquisition Guide is to "pull together"
the activities and critical documentation required and put
these requirements in a concise, maintainable, and easy to use
format to help acquisition managers plan ahead. The need for
managers to know the process and sequence of events and
average time to complete events is essential for planning and
ensuring timely obligation of funds budgeted. In addition,
corporate niangement, by seeing the entire process, can focus
on better ways to manage that process by minimizing the number
of reviews, maximizing parallel vice serial reviews,
establishing time limits for each reviewer, and providing a
feedback system for performance measurement against the
established time standards.
These actions will result in streamlining the internal
acquisition process to the minimum required time, which
together with effective planning by the acquisition manager
-33-

will achieve higher program obligation rates [16].
The acquisition guide does not supercede existing
notices, instructions, directives on the ship acquisition
process .
Theacquisitionguideprovides:
Corporate management a single consolidated overview of
all internal acquisition processes.
A quick ready reference identifying the reviews, approval
and documentation requirements during the entire
acquisition process.
Helpful advice from the "corporate memory" to program
managers, especially those managers involved in the
process for the first time.
A list of key personnel to assist the manager through the
acquisition process.
Quick feedback to managers on key issues.
Distribution of the acquisition guide to all personnel
involved in the acquisition process is essential. Updates to
the guide are provided on a periodic basis. However, if a
significant change or lesson learned requires immediate
dissemination, a one page update can be used.
Although presently not used by any U.S. Government Agency
ship acquisition organization, the acquisition guide is
successfully used by the Naval Air Systems Command of the U.S.
Navy. The Naval Air System Command Acquisition Guide could




It is interesting to note that NAVSEA has made a
conscious decision not to have a periodic newsletter or guide
related to ship acquisition. Years ago such an activity was
undertaken. However, it was discontinued because NAVSE^ felt
the benefits were not commensurate with the costs. The author
talked with NAVSEA PM's who would like to see the periodic
acquisition newsletter/guide resurrected as well as some who
thought they were already receiving too much paper.
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UPPER LEVEL MANAGEMENT FEEDBACK





idua 1 s above NAVSEA for the U.S. Navy
and above the Office of Acquisition for the U.S. Coast Guard.
There is an overlapping of the definitions of upper level
management and sponsor/user feedback. Many of the upper level
management military personnel are also operators. For this
report, operators in upper level management, as referenced to
the ship acquisition organization, are considered upper level
management. Other operators not in upper level management are
defined as sponsors/users.
References made to upper level management throughout this
chapter can refer to a multitude of organizational levels. It
could be the Executive Branch of the United States Government;
at other times it could be a military leader of the service
referenc ed .
3 . 1 R£g.iilaiifiii5.ZDij:£2.tiY£sZ.lQS.i:ny.2.i:iaafi.
Acquisition regulations, directives and instructions
promulgate policy guidelines on ship acquisition to ship
acquisition organizations. Additionally, these acquisition
regulations, directives and instructions often apply to many
upper level management organizations. Principal features of
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the regulations, directives and instructions that impact
directly on ship acquisitions include:
Competitive exploration of alternative design concepts.
Delineation of lines of authority, responsibility and
accountability are emphasized.
Details of program documentation.
Continuing mission area analyses and reaffirmation of
mission need is required at each decision point.
Adherence to established program initiation procedures.
Maximize use of competition.
Streamlining administrative procedures.
Controlling cost growth within programs.
Tailoring for each program acquisition strategy
encompassing all internal and external elements of the
acquisition process.
Pursuing readiness and sus ta inab i
1
ity based on realistic
operational availability thresholds as primary
objectives, equal in priority with achieving specified
performance levels, from the start of a program.
Increasing program stability.
Applying established or evolving technology having a high
probability of success.
Making well-balanced trade-offs between life-cycle costs,
system effectiveness, and schedule.
Many initiatives to improve the acquisition of major
defense systems have been undertaken by recent administrations
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and congresses. Emphasis has focused on acquisition
strategies and control methods to make the acquisition process
more efficient. Examples of acquisition strategies in the
ship acquisition world include total package procurement of
the late 1960's and early 1970's, lead ship/follow ship
prototyping, and multiyear procurement. Example acquisition
control initiatives include DOD's Acquisition Improvement
Program (Carlucci Initiatives) and the Federal Acquisition
Regula t ions .
Such government acquisition policy initiatives filter
down to ship acquisition organizations via regulations,
directives and instructions. Examples are:
(a) Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A109-
Established a government-wide policy for all executive branch
agencies to follow in the acquisition of major systems,
including ships. The document provid^es overall policy for
ship acquisition in government agencies, including acquisition
strategy and planning.
(b) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 - Establishes
DSARC process, procedures, requirements and documentation.
Establishes formats for Justification for Major System New
Start, System Concept Paper, Decision Coordinating Paper and
Integrated Program Summary.
(c) Department of Defense Directives 5000.3 - Mandates the
policy for the conduct of test and evaluation in the
acquisition of defense systems.
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(d) Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000. IB - Establishes
policy and procedures for all system acquisitions. In this
instruction, the Secretary of the Navy recognizes the
uniqueness of the ship acquisition process must be considered
when implementing upper level management acquisition
policies. Thus, unique development procedures and
milestones are established for ship acquisitions.
(e) Secretary of Transportation Instruction 4200.1MB
Establishes policy and procedures for Coast Guard
acquisitions
.
3 . 2 RfiiifiMfiZfifiarla
There are numerous r e v ie ws /b oa rd s throughout the ship
acquisition process. Each of these r e v i e ws / b oa rd s are a
1 esson- 1 earned mechanism with feedback loop. Section 2.2
discusses reviews/boards conducted within the ship acquisition
organization. Many reviews/boards conducted within the ship
acquisition organization precede reviews/boards conducted by
upper level management. This section will discuss
reviews/boards conducted by upper level management. See
Chapter 4 for an explanation of r e v ie ws /b oa rd s conducted by
sponsors/users.
R e v i e ws / b oa r d s are conducted to provide objective
progress measurement and feedback on ship acquisition
programs. Satisfactory progress and validation of project
objectives are established as prerequisites to entering the
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next phase of the ship acquisition process.
Names of reviews/boards vary with different ship
acquisition organizations. Since no two ship acquisition
processes are the same, r e v i e w s / b o a r d s for each ship
acquisition process are also different. The basic breakdown
of reviews/boards conducted on a ship acquisition are:
- Business
- Technical
- F inane ia 1
- Logistics
- Construction
- Competition Advocate/Acquisition Streamlining
See Section 2.2 for an explanation of the different types
of r e V ie ws /b oa rd s . Examples of upper level management
reviews/boards are:
(a) Coast Guard Acquisition Review Council - Chaired by the
Coast Guard Acquisition Executive, the Coast Guard Acquisition
Review Council monitors implementation of the concepts
embodied in 0MB Circular A-109 in the Coast Guard, reviews
project progress and plans at major project milestones, and
approves system baselines. The Chief Counsel, Resource
D irec t or /C omp t ro 1 1 er , all Operating Program Directors, and
Acquisition Support Program Director are permanent members.
Support Program Directors are members when their subordinates




(b) Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council - A high level
advisory group which appraises the Secretary of Defense on the
program status and readiness of each major defense system to
proceed to the next phase in the acquisition process.
(c) Navy's Ship Characteristics and Improvement Board - This
special panel provides recommendations to the Chief of Naval
Operations on all aspects of ship acquisition and improvement
at various points in the ship design process.
(d) Post Program - Post program reviews are often conducted
on programs which experienced difficulties.
3.3 2i.i:£affilining.
The objective of streamlining is to identify, develop,
and implement improvements in the acquisition process.
Streamlining includes deleting unnecessary requirements or
references, tailoring specifications, substitution of
commercial products when feasible, and maximum use of off-the-
shelf items. Areas within acquisition processes that provide
the greatest benefits from streamlining efforts include:
- defining mission requirements
- specifications and standards
- milestone requirements
- contract terms and conditions
- scheduling
- testing and evaluation [17]
Inherent in the streamlining of any acquisition is the
potential for increased risk. If so, the potential payoffs or

benefits must then outweigh the risk if a decision maker is
expected to assume the additional risk. During streamlining,
it is imperative that the total system be viewed.
Several ways to handle risk in the streamlining
environment are through:
Risk avoidance - Identify and analyze alternatives and
select the least risk/no risk alternative.
Risk transfer - Put more of risk on the contractor
through warranties, fixed priced contracts, etc.
Risk assumption - Streamline but assume a greater risk.
Upper level management of both the U.S. Navy and U.S.
Coast Guard ship acquisition organizations have streamlining
organizations. These streamlining organizations review all
ship acquisitions to ensure streamliing principles are
followed. An example of a streamlining organization is the
Streamlining Advocate of the U.S. Navy. He reports to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Shipbuilding and Logistics,
on all ship acquisition streamlining efforts.
Upper level management's direct involvement in the ship
acquisition process can come from many organizations and in
many forms. For the U.S. Navy, the following upper level
management organizations can have a direct effect on a ship
acquisition program.
- Chief Naval Operations Office
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- Secretary of Navy Office
- Secretary of Defense Office
- Executive Branch of U.S. Government
- Legislative Branch of U.S. Government
For the U.S. Co.st Guard, the following upper level
management organizations can have a direct effect on a ship
acquisition program.
- Commandant of the Coast Guard Office
- Secretary of Transportation Office
- Executive Branch of U.S. Government
- Legislative Branch of U.S. Government
Possible upper level management direct involvement
methods include:
- Direc t ord era .
- Informal top level talks.
- Withholding, reducing or increasing funding.
Upper level management direct involvement may be in the
form of specific technically oriented guidelines or may be
more general guidance. Specific technically oriented
guideline examples include:
- Setting maximum length of a ship.
- Setting maximum manning level of a ship.
- Selecting specific weapon systems.
General guidance examples include:
- Setting general performance requirements.
- Setting constraints on cost.
-2|H_

- Setting schedule requirements.
An example of upper level management direct involvement
in the ship acquisition process was the U.S. Navy's DDG-51
guided missile destroyer program. In an effort to meet unit
cost goals of $1.1 billion for he lead ship and $700 million
for follow-on ships (1983 dollars), the Secretary of the Navy
ordered structural and system design changes. Specifically,
























SPONSOR / USER FEEDBACK
Sponsor/user feedback is defined as feedback from the
military personnel who actually operate the ships. There is
an overlapping of the definitions of upper-level management
and sponsor/user feedback. Many of the upper level management
military personnel are also operators.
For this report, operators in upper level management, as
referenced to the ship acquisition organization, are
considered upper level management. Other operators, not in
upper level management, are defined as sponsors/users.
References made to sponsor, user or operator throughout this
chapter can refer to a multitude of organizational levels. It
could be a three-star admiral; at other times it could be a
commander in charge of an element within the sponsor/user
organ izat ion .
Testing and evaluation is often conducted by
organizations separate to the sponsor/user organization.
However, all test and evaluation is discussed in this chapter
with the exception of developmental test and evaluation which
is discussed in Chapter 6.
4.1 RfeUfintfi.
Sp on s o r s /u s e r s want ships that are effective weapon
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systems able to perform their missions successfully in their
intended environment. One method the sponsor/user uses to get
lessons learned from ship performance to the ship acquisition
organization is through reports. Usually these reports also
go to upper level management. There are two basic groups of
reports, technical and operational.
Technical reports provide information on ship
equipment/system failures, down time, difficulty in obtaining
spare parts, etc. This information is then used by the ship
acquisition organization to improve existing equipment/systems
problems, make choices on equipment/system types to use in new
acquisitions, etc. An example technical report used by the
ship acquisition organization is the casualty reporting system
used by both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard.
Mission area analysis is done on a continuing basis to
assess the ability of current ships* capabilities to meet
mission requirements. This analysis is reported via
operational reports. Upper level management uses these
reports and other data obtained from intelligence sources to
determine when current ship capabilities are less than
required to meet mission requirements. At this point, much of
the previous lessons learned and experiences are turned into
basic requirements definitions for a new ship. The ship
acquisition organization usually assists upper level
management is shaping these basic requirements definitions.
Operational reports from the recent U.S.S. Stack incident
-i|8-

present an example of how operational reports provided lessons
learned to the ship acquisition organization.
^.2 Oc^natiiiiial Ifiatiiig. and. Exaluaiiiin
Testing and evaluation organizations are not unique to
the sponsor/user organization. Usually they are separate
organizations which report directly to upper level management.
However, most of the personnel in these test and evaluation
organizations are operators on assignment away from the
sponsor/user organization. Thus, operational testing and
evaluation is included in this chapter.
There are two basic types of test and evaluation:
developmental and operational. Developmental test and
evaluation is discussed in Chapter 6 of this report.
Operational test and evaluation is conducted to estimate a
system's operational effectiveness and operational
suitability, identify needed ni edifications, and provide
information on tactics, doctrine, organization and personnel
requirements. Testing is expensive and time consuming but
compared to the development and construction costs of a
complex, expensive ship that cannot fulfill its designed
mission, the costs and time involved are inconsequential.
Engineering feedback and correction of deficiencies found
during testing are an essential part of the design and
engineering process. Classic engineering requires feedback
from the operator to the responsible engineer regarding the
-49-

performance of the equipment or system in question.
Additionally, successful accomplishment of test and evaluation
objectives are essential so proper decisions can be made
regarding commitment of significant additional resources to a
program or to advance it from one acquisition phase to
another
.
The long design, engineering and construction period of a
major ship will normally preclude completion of the lead ship
and accomplishment of tests prior to the decision to proceed
to follow on ships. Thus, it is critical that tests be
conducted properly so any problems identified can be corrected
on follow on ships.
The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard are required to have
organizations, separate and distinct from the ship acquisition
organization and the sponsor/user organization, that are
responsible for operational test and evaluation. Example
organizations for the U.S. Navy are the Operational Test and
Evaluation Force and the Board of Inspection and Survey. An
example U.S. Coast Guard organization is the Provisional
Acceptance Trial Board.
Inspections are similar to testing and evaluation with
the exception of the time frame in which they are held.
Inspections are usually held on ships that have already gone
through testing and evaluation and are now operating ships of




Inspections provide technical and operational information
on operating ships. Inspection deficiencies are documented
and analyzed. The results of the findings and recommendations
are sent to upper level management with the ship acquisition
organization also receiving a copy. The ship acquisition
organization uses these lessons learned in the design and
acquisition of new ships.
General deficiencies found by inspection teams include:
Loss or serious degradation of required operational
capabil i ties
.
A serious or likely safety hazard to personnel or
material .
Failure of installed systems and/or equipments to meet
approved characteristics, specifications, or requirements
for material performance.
Shortages or inadequacies of repair parts, tools,
equipage, test equipment technical publications,
technical drawings, administrative maintenance, or other
logistic concerns.
Of special concern for the ship acquisition organization
are recurring deficiencies.
An example U.S. Navy inspection organization is the Board
of Inspection and Survey. The Board of Inspection and Survey
does a thorough inspection of every U.S. Navy surface ship
every three years.
Items emphasized at the inspections are:
-51-

That general specifications for ships of the U.S. Navy
must be the standard for construction of warships.
That operational reliability must be a primary
consideration in warship design.
That ship survivability must be given greater emphasis in
ship des ign [33.
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 6, the Board of Inspection
and Survey also conducts design reviews of new ship
acquisitions early in the design process.
Much of the communication between the ship acquisition
organization and the sponsor/user is informal. The ship
acquisition organization works closely with the sponsor/user
regarding the ship program and possible changes. This
constant contact allows the ship acquisition organization to
be familiar with the various needs of the ship sponsor/user
and the unique circumstances of the type of ship planned.
Many of the military personnel in the ship acquisition
organization are ship sponsors/users temporarily assigned to
the ship acquisition organization. Additionally, other
military personnel in the ship acquisition organization have
had shipboard experience. The operating knowledge these two
groups bring to the ship acquisition organization is extremely





























Formal training feedback is defined as feedback provided
through a systematic program of studies or efforts provided by
previous or present assignments.
5.1 SQ_h.Q_Q_ls.
A major method to get past lessons learned and new
innovative ideas into the ship acquisition process is through
schools. Defense Systems Management College at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia is the major U.S. Government school for senior
acquisition personnel. However, there are many U.S.
Government schools, institutions and training centers in the
Washington, D.C. area available to the ship acquisition
personnel of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard.
Ship acquisition organizations, upper level management,
s p on s or s /u s e r s and even industry provide lessons learned/
feedback into the curriculum at these schools.
Some of the schools and training centers in the
Washington, D.C. area and a sample of some of the courses they
have available are listed below:
(a) Ac qu is i t ion / Log is t ic s Management Training Center --
Located in the Washington, D.C. area, this training center
provides short courses in man ag emen t -r e 1 a t ed areas. The
school provides new civilian naval civil service personnel
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with an introduction to the Navy. Additionally, courses are
offered that would be valuable to veterans of the ship
acquisition process. Example courses offered are:
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System -- a five day
overview of the PPBS system.
System acquisition management -- a five day overview of
the acquisition process. The course content relies
heavily on class involvement with students sharing their
past acquisition experiences,
(b) Defense System Management College --
The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) is a
Department of Defense (DOD) institution dedicated to providing
education to the defense acquisition community and, in
particular, program management office personnel. Education is
provided in the program management policies, philosophies,
skills, and techniques necessary for the effective and
efficient execution of defense weapon systems acquisition
pro jec ts
.
In addition to its educational mission, DSMC has a
research mission. Research in applied management science is
conducted to support the above educational mission and to
support the DOD acquisition community.
The third DSMC mission is dissemination of information to
the DOD acquisition community.
Besides the main campus at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, DSMC
has established four regional centers in the United States at
which selected courses of instruction are offered:
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- Hun ts vi lie
- St. Louis
- Los Ange 1 es
- Boston
Example courses offered are:
Program Management Course -- This 20-week course is a
study of program management from the PM's point of view.
Instruction is designed to increase the student's ability
to manage successfully a defense system acquisition
program through functional knowledge, case studies,
lessons learned, and a series of s tu d en t - in t e rac t i v
e
decision exercises. This course is now a mandatory
prerequisite for all new PM's.
Technical Management Course -- This three-week course
provides an introduction to concepts, scope, and
application of technical management disciplines to the
systems acquisition process. Disciplines include system
engineering, integrated logistics support, test and
evaluation and production [9].
Note: The program management course is highly desireable
for all higher ranking personnel, both civilian and military,
in a program office. Unfortunately, DSMC has limitations on
the number of students it can accommodate. Therefore, NAVSEA
is presently developing their own mini-program management
course to accommodate those who are unable to attend DSMC.
NAVSEA expects this course to get started in September 1988.
(c) Local c o 1 1 eg e s /u n i v e r s i t i e s -- Local colleges and
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universities also provide ship acquisition personnel an
opportunity to take courses. An example is the Northern
Virginia Graduate Center in the Washington, D.C. area.
(d) Industrial War College -- The Industrial War College is
located at Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C. A major portion of
the instruction is finance and contract related. An overview
of the acquisition and production processes is included in the
studies. Field trips to industrial sights are also part of
the curriculum.
(e) NAVSEA Institute -- NAVSEA Institute has engineering,
technical and professional courses for NAVSEA personnel,
although personnel from other commands within the Navy also
attend. The courses are usually taught in the late afternoon
or evening so as not to interfere with normal working hours.
Taught in connection with Virginia Tech, college credit and
even a degree program are possible from NAVSEA Institute. The
Institute faculty consists of Virginia Tech professors, NAVSEA
personnel, and other personnel in the Navy or connected to the
Navy in some way. Example course descriptions:
Operations research methodology — Probabilistic
operations research models of interest to several
academic disciplines: inventory control, queuing theory,
and Monte Carlo simulation.
Ship acquisition for engineers — To provide an
instructional course that will enhance the engineer's
understanding of ship acquisition project management. To
reinforce these instructions, practical applications and
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assignments are also provided. Upon completion of this
course, the engineer will be able to participate in the
ship acquisition process with understanding and respond
to ship acquisition tasks in a positive, meaningful and
productive manner [17].
5.2 Cs.LS.S.L-ls.i.hS.
Ship acquisition personnel receive feedback via past
experiences they encounter during previous assignments.
Career paths provide a systematic approach to certification,
selection, training and career development of individuals in
the acquisition management profession.
Career path development can be shaped by:
Requiring specific training
Acquisition assignments
Education (discussed in Section 5.1)
Field experience (Operation experience ou ships, in
shipyards, e tc .)
Recommending other training
Professional societies (SNAME, etc.)
Assignments must be of sufficient length to ensure not
only effective experience and evaluation, but also continuity
of management. Personnel should be selected for assignment on
basis of skills, experience and demonstrated ability to
successfully perform the contemplated assignment.
Certification points are required to ensure that personnel




Career paths for ship acquisition personnel of the U.S.
Navy and U.S. Coast Guard vary considerably. The U.S. Navy
acquires many more ships than the U.S. Coast Guard. There are
considerably more civilian and military personnel in the U.S.
Navy's ship acquisition organization. With these larger
numbers of personnel, the efforts to establish career paths
for the military and civilian personnel in the U.S. Navy are
considered worthwhile efforts.
The U.S. Navy currently has career paths in acquisition
for both military and civilian personnel. Involved in ship
acquisition are Materiel Professional and Engineering Duty
Officers. The civilian counterpart, the Civilian Materiel
Professional, is presently being defined at NAVSEA. The
objectives of these programs are to enhance the performance,
certify qualifications and provide developmental opportunities
for candidates of top ship acquisition management positions.
Conversely, the U.S. Coast Guard has a much smaller
personnel base to draw from. These limited personnel
resources make it more difficult to establish career paths in
ship acquisition. Operational career paths have priority for
military personnel. Civilian personnel numbers are too small
to easily establish career paths for them.
5.3 T^as-laing. M^ihads








Lectures are the traditional method of training at
schools. Lessons learned from the ship acquisition
organization, upper level management, sponsors/users, industry
and other organizations are presented in an effective manner.
Guest speakers provide the opportunity for personnel from
organizations involved in the ship acquisition process to give
first-hand knowledge of their experiences. Additionally, the
interaction provided by industry, upper level management, and
sponsor/user involvement with ship acquisition personnel is
also valuable.
Field trips provide ship acquisition personnel the
opportunity to witness first-hand the ship acquisition process
at various stages, such as design, construction, etc.
An excellent method used by schools to present lessons
learned in a formal training method is through the use of case
studies. Few ship acquisition case studies now exist in
acquisition training programs. The great majority of teaching
materials and courses are aimed at the acquisition of objects
that can be mass produced (e.g. missiles, planes). Appendix D































RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FEEDBACK
A key factor in the allies' WORLD WAR II victory was the
effective use of new technologies. Today, new weapons and
technologies pile up upon themselves as the pace of the
technological change accelerates. Weapons seem to become
obsolete almost at the time of their introduction into the
fleet. Thus, efficient use of research and development assets
is essential to ensure new technologies get to the fleet
quickly .
Many of the decisions made in the ship acquisition
process are based on information supplied by research and
development organizations. Research and development
organizations often conduct studies based on new and
innovative ideas. However, much of the research is based on
problems identified or suggestions made from upper level
management, sponsors/users, test and evaluation organizations,
and industry. Thus, research and development organizations
close the loop to ship acquisition organizations on some of
lessons learned obtained by upper level management,




6.1 E.s.s.s.^LQ.h and. ^s.:Ls.lQ.s.ms.RtL
Research, develop inent and engineering is required for
product improvement of existing systems and for next
generation systems. Research and development organizations
provide feedback to the ship acquisition organization on the
status of research projects currently under develop ojent and
which could/will be used in c u r re n t / f u tu re acquisitions.
Government research labs, private research labs, academia,
industry, and ship acquisition organizations all perform
research and development functions.
The impact of the ocean environment upon the tactical and
strategic forces and their operations and system performance
must be understood and accounted for to most effectively
employ naval forces. In this regard, all ship research and
development programs must consider appropriate environmental
factors from program initiation through test and evaluation to
full operational capability.
Current acquisition processes push state-of-the-art
technology. A multitude of complex sub-systems can complicate
development, engineering and construction processes. Both of
these factors increase the likelihood of problems.
Additionally, the problem of concurrent development makes risk
assessment a key to a successful ship acquisition.
Risk is the uncertainty of obtaining objectives in system
and hardware acquisitions, usually expressed in terms of
probability. After program initiation and prior to full scale
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engineering development, the program must include efforts to
identify, control and reduce program risk. Reduction of
system capabilities is one approach that should be considered
to reduce technical risk. Industry must participate in risk
reduction efforts to achieve a clear understanding of program
objectives, to produce schedule realism, and effective cost
estimates .
Research and development organizations' risk management
objectives include:
Identification of potential problem areas prior to the
time when they actually impact the acquisition program
adverse ly
.
Presentation to the ship acquisition organization of the
magnitude of the risk, its implication and the courses of
action being taken or recommended to eliminate or
minimize the risk. These must not be regarded as one-
time actions. The ship acquisition organization must be
kept informed by tracking the development in an
identified risk area until the problem has been corrected
or reduced to an acceptable level.
Ship acquisition often has a high degree of concurrency
between development and construction. Ship acquisition
prototyping is seldom used above the sub-system level. The
amount of concurrency is directly related to the amount of
risk in the program.
The amount or degree of concurrency should be keyed on
-en-

the extent of potential savings in acquisition time balanced
against technical, cost, and supportabi 1 ity risk and urgency
of the acquisition program. In general, the more concurrency
you have the more risk involved in the program.
Full scale prototyping of ships is expensive and time
consuming. However, system prototyping is possible and does
reduce the risk of a ship acquisition program.
The use of land-based and sea-based test sites to prove
computer programs and hardware compatibilities and aid in
other facets of system integration is essential for reducing
risks. Land-based test sites may serve the following
purposes :
As an aid in design, development, integration and test of
comba t sys t ems
.
As a production tool to aid in the test and checkout of
equipments for the lead and follow ships.
As a training aid for fleet personnel.
For use in configuration management, to test proposed
design changes in hardware and computer programs [1].
Thus, risk can be reduced by bringing to development only
mature systems and preplanned product improvements for follow-
on insertion of those technologies that are not sufficiently
mature. This means that in so far as possible, engineering
development would consist primarily of systems integration,
integrated logistics support and construction preparedness.
Those programs requiring more research will remain in the
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research and development labs.
Another method of reducing risk is by using non-
developmental items. Non -d e V e
1
opmen t a 1 items refer to
hardware and software that are already developed, available
and capable of fulfilling U.S. Government agency requirements,
thereby minimizing or eliminating the need for costly, time-
consuming government-sponsored research and development
programs. Non -d e v e 1 op men t items offer the opportunity to
rapidly field state of the art technology. Non-developmental
items are usually off-the-shelf or commercial type products,
but may also include equipment already developed by or for the
U.S. Gove rnraen t.
6.2 Design
Some ship acquisition programs have experienced
difficulties and delays in achieving operational status of the
total ship system. The need is to identify an acquisition
approach that will avoid these problems and achieve a fully
integrated ship system in a timely and cost-effective manner.
The difficulty results primarily from the complexity of a ship
and its many systems.
In order to achieve effective combat systems integration,
early attention must be given to total system design. While
the roots of the integration problem are at the beginning of a
program, the problems have manifested themselves at the time
the systems are being tested. A special ongoing effort is
needed for integrating and testing the systems during detailed
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design and construction [1].
Ship design falls under research and development in the
ship acquisition process. Ship design is accomplished by the
ship acquisition organization, industry or some type of joint
effort between the ship acquisition organization and industry.
Industry involvement may come from one company or from many
companies competing. Early and continual ship builder
involvement in the ship design is essential to a smooth
transition from design and engineering to construction.
The ship design organization is a major focal point for
lessons learned to which other organizations can feedback
information. Research and development organizations feedback
on the status of current programs under development. Industry
provides inputs on design which affect ship construction.
Additionally, due to the long ship acquisition process, ship
mission profiles may change. Thus, the design organization
may also receive feedback from sponsors/users and upper level
management. The design and ship acquisition organizations
using inputs from research and development organizations,
industry, sponsors/users and upper level management identify
the costly design requirements where the increase system
performance is small relative to the level of resources
required. Those design requirements should be critically
reviewed to assess the impact on warfighting capability that
results from their reduction or elimination.
An example of outside involvement in the ship design
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process is the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey review of
contract drawings and specifications. These reviews may last
3-^ days with hundreds of comments generated as a result. All
comments must be satisfactorily resolved between the Board of
Inspection and Survey and the design team or the open issues
are submitted to the OPNAV sponsor for adjudication.
6.3 D£Y£lii£ffi£Qial l£si and. Exaljiatian
Testing and evaluations are undertaken to demonstrate
feasibility, address areas of risk and determine design
alternatives and trade-offs necessary to best achieve project
objectives. There are two basic types of tests and
evaluations: developmental and operational. Developmental
test and evaluation is explained in this section. Operational
test and evaluation is covered in Chapter ^.
Developmental test and evaluation is conducted to assist
engineering design and developemnt process and to verify
attainment of technical performance specifications and
objectives. It includes test and evaluation of components,
subsystems, hard war e/ s o ft war e integration, and systems.
Testing and evaluation of compatibility and interoperability
with existing or planned equipment and systems are also
included. Developmental test and evaluation is accomplished
by research and development organizations, industry and the
ship acquisition organizations.
Today, prototypes are seldom used in the ship acquisition
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process. The long design, engineering and construction period
of a ship will normally preclude completion of the lead ship
and accomplishment of test thereon prior to the decision to
proceed with follow ships. Therefore, successive phases of
developmental t st and evaluation are accomplished early at
the land-based or sea-based test installations and on the lead
ship to reduce risk and minimize the need for modification to
follow on ships. To assure these tests are properly time
phased, that adequate resources are available, and that
duplicative or redundant testing is eliminated, a properly
integrated test program is required. Deficiencies disclosed
by developmental test and evaluation provide valuable lessons
learned to the builders of follow-on ships.
Close contact between developmental test and evaluation
as well as operational test and evaluation organizations is
essential. Besides reducing duplicate testing, lessons
learned by developmental test and evaluation organizations can
be passed to the operational test and evaluation
organiza t ions .
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U.S. Government agencies are responsible for 9Q% of the
dollar value of all ships built and 90? of the ship overhaul
and repair work accomplished in the United States [8]. The
number of shipyards that can compete on a ship order goes from
one (for an aircraft carrier) or two (for a nuclear submarine)
to a few dozen (theoretical for a small non-combatant).
Additionally, many other factors make ship acquisition and the
shipbuilding industry unique as compared to other defense
acquisitions and industries. (A more complete list of the
differences in ship acquisition and other miajor defense
acquisitions is contained in Appendix E.)
The news media is full of reports of problems U.S.
Government agencies have with shipbuilding companies.
Allegations of overpricing of spare parts or system
components, criminal investigations of alleged overcharging
and questionable charges to overhead, malfunctioning and
nonfunctioning weapon systems, and evidences of atrocious
quality control abound. However, it is to the advantage of
both U.S. Government agencies and industry that the
relationship between them be a good one.
Industry provides important feedback to the ship
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acquisition organization and upper level management. This
feedback can come in the form of positive feedback like the
value engineering or in the form of negative feedback like an
industry claim against the U.S. Government. These lessons
learned provide the ship acquisition organization valuable
information for use on future ship acquisitions.
7.1 £la.iffi&
The relationship between the U.S. Government and the
Defense Industry is unique as compared to the normal free
market. Special arrangements often include:
- Administered prices and profits.
- Unusual risk-sharing.
- Unilateral contract abrogation rights.
- Government shaping the product (vice the free market).
Many of the goals of U.S. Government and defense industry
vary greatly. Goals of government include:
A weapon systeir is produced/constructed under or on time;
under or within budget; and meets all requirements for
operability, maintainability and reliability.
Maintaining a strong industrial base necessary for a
strong defense.
Ensuring that competition is vigorously pursued on each
acquisition where it makes sense.
Goals of industry include:




- Acceptable cash flows.
- Good long term health.
- Stability.
- A fair share of the market.
- Technological advancement.
Considering their unique relationship and the many
conflicting goals between government and industry, it is not
surprising that often an adversarial relationship exists. Add
the many disadvantages of ship building such as no or little
prototyping, long construction times, industry's heavy
reliance on the government for business, etc., and it is easy
to see why problems will evolve. These problems often result
in court cases or claims. These court cases and claims
provide valuable lessons learned to the ship acquisition
organization and upper level management.
Government court cases against industry include:
- Recovery of overpayments.
- Recovery of spare parts overpricing.
- Failure to meet specified performance standards.
- Failure to make delivery dates [28],
Industry claims against the government include:
Delays due to late delivery of government furnished
material, equipment or information.
Disruption of schedule due to design changes.
Subcontractor problems [35].
An important aspect of claims avoidance programs is the
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documentation of significant contract events. The rationale
for this process is that adequate documentation is the key to
the government's ability to verify, qualify, or refute
contractor claims.
To ensure documentation is accomplished the U.S. Navy has
an office in NAVSEA which provides assistance and guidance to
SUPSHIPS on claims matters. This office compiles statistics
on claims from quarterly reports submitted by SUPSHIPS,
supplies feedback on lessons learned from prior claim, s,
provides training in claims avoidance, is involved in the
processing of claims, and conducts contract management reviews
once every 3 years at each SUPSHIP. These reviews include
examining actions taken by the SUPSHIPS to avoid claims.
SUPSHIP Operations Review Teams from NAVSEA's Industrial and
Facilities Management Directorate also look at claims
avoidance programs during their SUPSHIP effectiveness reviews,
which also are conducted on a 3-year cycle [35].
Historically, when a shipbuilder discovered that it was
in a loss position or was approaching such a position, claims
would often be made against the government. In the Naval Ship
Procurement Process Study of the late 1970's [1], a study
team's appraisal of lessons learned from an analysis of the
1970's claim^s situation showed that the Navy suffers from
unrealistic prices in the long run since shipbuilders facing
losses on contracts are likely to submit claims [35]. Thus,
it is important that ship acquisition organization
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appropriately tailor contracts on a case by case basis
including limitations and duration in order to achieve a cost-
effective agreement in light of the technical risk and other
program uncertainties.
7.2 £iia]l£.££
Industry provides feedback to the ship acquisition
organization via engineering change proposals. These
engineering change proposals provide a large amount of
technical information considering the large number of changes
that occur during ship construction. Typically, a destroyer
size combatant can have as many as 1,000 changes.
Changes can have numerous causes, such as:
Concurrent development of weapon systems and ship
construction .
Improvements to systems previously developed.
Errors/omissions in plans, specifications, and drawings.
Additional requirements established after contract award
[28].
Formal changes modify contracts in writing. They are
made only to correct deficiencies or errors in design, meet
operational requirements, provide for safety of personnel and
equipment, or save money.
A constructive change results from ship acquisition
organization action or inaction that causes the shipbuilder to





7.3 Oitiai: AQ.auifiii.iaa Zlq.q.s.s.s. Ln.^Q.l:Ls.ms.n.tL
Mutual distrust between government and its contractors
impedes the ship acquisition process. The concept that the
government can get a better deal when it has an adversarial
relationship with industry is wrong, just as wrong as the
opposite extreme of mutual blind faith. It is advantageous
for both industry and government to proceed on the basis of
informed trust. That approach to the acquisition process is
based on cooperation, teamwork, and joint planning for the
best, while being prepared for the worst.
The Fleet Ballistic Missile program is an outstanding
example of how the ship acquisition organization and industry
managers, working side-by-side in such an environment, can
make a real difference in the final outcome of a program.
When President Eisenhower approved this project in 1955,
immense technical problems had yet to be overcome. The solid
fuel missile did not exist, and knowledge of inertial
guidance, ship navigation, and hypersonic aerodynamics was
inadequate. Moreover, the United States had not even launched
a missile from a submerged submarine. Yet five years later,
the USS George Washington left Charleston, South Carolina, on
its first operational patrol, armed with 16 nuclear missiles.
Much credit for this feat goes to the Navy, which convened the
steering task group of key Navy and contractor executives who
still meet regularly to apply their joint skills to program
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p rob 1 ems [ ^0 ]
.
Ships are unique, high cost, often not fully tested
complex technology that is at the leading edge of the state of
the art. They are often used in remote parts of the world not
readily available to contractor service representatives.
Industry involvement in the ship acquisition process must
start early in the design process and carry on through
construction and testing.
Some of the possible modes of participation of U.S.
industry in ship acquisition process include:




Hiring shipbuilders to critique the on going design is
frequently employed, as is fariTiing-out the design to all
interested shipyards for a free review. Either of these
methods help remove some of the ambiguity out of the
specifications. Additionally, design comments also facilitate
the shipbuilders to generate a more realistic price proposal.
A collocated design team where shipbuilders and ship
acquisition personnel work on design together is another
method where industry provides design feedback to the ship
acquisition organization.
Once construction has started, cost and schedule
performance is monitored by the ship acquisition organization.
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Its responsibilities include reviewing the contractor's
management and operations controls to determine whether the
direct and indirect costs charged to government contracts are
reasonable, allocable and allowable. Additionally, contractor
reports and briefings are given to the government on a
periodic basis.
Testing coordination between the contractor and
government is essential. Usually contractor testing precedes
government testing. Government observation of contractor
testing is very helpful and provides lessons learned on future
government tests.
Industry organizations provide lessons learned on the
ship acquisition process via reports they publish, symposia,
seminars, or direct contact with the ship acquisition
organiza t ion .




























Other feedback is defined as feedback which does not fit
into any of the other groups of feedback.
8 . 1 Eit£j:iial_5iLiili£^
Since annual ship acquisition purchases by U.S.
Government agencies run into billions of dollars, much
attention and emphasis is given by numerous organizations
external to the ship acquisition process. These external
organizations conduct studies, analyze and write papers on
acquisition process. Some of the long-standing concerns
addressed include: inadequate competition, program stability,
contract types, profit policy, waste, fraud, abuse, industrial
base, risk assessment and others. These studies provide
feedback to the ship acquisition community by bringing forth
errors, identifying problems, recommending changes and even
noting past and present acquisition policies and actions which
they consider beneficial.
The following are examples of some of the publications in
which these studies can be found:
(a) Defense Management Journal (DMJ) (periodical) - Countless
articles on defense management including ship acquisition.




Author: Fisher, Andrea L.
Title: "DOD Needs a Professional Acquisition Corps"
Date: 3rd Qtr, 1986
Abstract: This article discusses the need for a professional
acquisition corps within DOD. A case is made for
increasing the emphasis on acquisition as a profession
within DOD. The author proposes a model for establishing
and maintaining an elite corps of acquisition
professionals [2^].
(b) DSMC Publications - DSMC provides numerous publications
with information on the acquisition community.
Exaniple DSMC publications:
The "Acquisition Strategy Guide" - provides a wealth of
information for program manager's concerning the development
and execution of an acquisition strategy.
The bi-monthly periodical "Program Manager" is one
vehicle for the transmission of information on policies,
trends, events, and current thinking affecting program
management and defense systems acquisition [8].
(c) Department of the Navy - There are numerous acquisition
studies and reports published by the Department of the Navy
external to the ship acquisition organization. Many of these
reports are applicable to ship acquisition.
Two examples of Department of the Navy publications are:
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"Best Practices - How to Avoid Surprises in the World's
Most Complicated Technical Process - The Transition from
Development to Production." - NAVSO P-6071, March 1986.- This
manual attempts to enhance the enlightenment of both
government and industry by identifying specific practices in
current use and their potentially adverse consequences in
terms of cost, schedule, performance and readiness. It
describes the proven best practices which avoid or alleviate
these consequences, and provides background information to
understand their rationale [10].
"Naval Ship Procurement Process Study," July 1978. - A
very extensive study on the Navy's ship acquisition process.
Its goal was to examine and validate U.S. Navy ship
acquisition policies and procedures and to offer suggestions
regarding changes to selected policies with a view to maximum
curtailment of future shipbuilder claims. The one and one-
half years of research included interviews with personnel in
industry and a number of Navy personnel. Although the report
is quite old, and many changes have taken place since it was
completed, many of the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations are still valid today [1].
(d) Intercollegiate Case Clearing House (ICCH) - Case studies
on a wide range of topics including ship acquisition.





Title: "Case Study - Cost Estimating for the Guided Missile
Frigate (FFG - 7)"
Date: 1980
Abstract: This case study discusses the role of cost
estimating in the Navy's FFG-7 program. The issues of
design-to-cost, life-cycle costs, and fly-before-buy are
also discussed. The case includes a history of cost
estimating of the FFG-7 program and problems encountered
[24].
(e) Naval Engineers Journal (NEJ) (periodical) - Many
articles on a wide variety of naval related topics such as
scientific and technical data but also information related to
ship acquisition, design, and management.
Example - NEJ Article Abstract related to ship
acquisition feedback:
Author(s): Baker, Capt. Robert; Reed, Cdr. Michael
Title: "Twenty Steps to a Better Fleet: INSURV Review of
Surface Ship Design Engineering"
Abstract: This article reports on the Navy's Board of
Inspection Survey's (INSURV) findings regarding fleet
characteristics resulting from past Navy ship design
efforts. Twenty engineering principles have been
identified in six different areas. The paper emphasizes:
standardization of GENSPECS, the importance of




(f) Rand Corporation Studies - The more than 25 years of
research conducted at the Rand Corporation on military
research development and procurement provide a unique
analytical perspective.
See Michael Rich, Edmund Dews and C.L. Batton. lfliE.iliii.iD.g.
Lh.s. Miiiianx ks.Q.]i.ls.lLlQ.n. Llq.q.s.s.s.^ h.s.s.s.Q.RS. Ls.a.iLn.s.^ In^m Ra.ad
RfiS-Sancil , Report R-3373-AF/RC (Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Corporation, February 1986); The preface of this report lists
the most notable of the Rand Studies.
(g) Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME)
(periodical) - Numerous articles on general acquisition
management, ship production, contract claims, etc.
Example SNAME Article Abstract related to ship
acquisition feedback:
Author: Bachko, Nicholas
Title: Towards Improved Shipbuilding Contracts in the 1980's."
Date: April 1978
Abstract: This paper discusses elements of commercial
shipbuilding contracts, including escalation clauses and
contract claims. The author outlines contract financial
pressures, the impact of changes and trends in
shipbuilding contracts. Some recommendations to improve
the pro forma ship construction contract are also given
[24].
Other non-government organizations that provide feedback
to the ship acquisition organization are the American Society
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of Naval Engineers (ASNE), American Logistics Association
(ALA), Society of Logistics Engineers (SOLE), and American
Society of Military Comptrollers (ASMC) plus trade
associations such as the Shipbuilders Council of America.
These organizations provide invaluable advice concerning the
feasibility of the Project Manager's acquisition strategy and
technical approach.
A more complete list of ship acquisition and ship
acquisition feedback articles can be found in the reference
section of this study and the annotated bibliography of
reference 2M.
8 . 2 S£L££.ial_Eit£i:rial_Si:iiii£S.
Three types of external studies are considered to be
special in that they are direct reports to the President of
the United States, Congress of the United States and
Departments of the United States Government. These reports
are President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,
General Accounting Office and Inspector General Reports.
Feedback from these reports deserves particular attention
since they can have a direct impact on support and funding for
acquisition programs or future programs.
( a ) T]i£_Eii£.£.id.£.iii.£_fiiii£_£ib.taa_£.fiminifi.fi.i£ii_iiii_D£i:£ ii5.fi.
These studies by defense management experts assess the
effectiveness of U.S. defense management. As one might
expect, particular attention is given to defense acquisition
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management, organization and procedures.
Example "Presidents Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management" Report abstract:
Title: "A Formula for Action - A Report to the President on
Defense Acquisition"
Abstract: This report assesses the effectiveness of the U.S.
defense acquisition system. A comparison is presented
between defense acquisition and other government and
private systems. A model is identified, based on other
successful acquisition efforts. Key recommendations
address: acquisition streamlining; cost reduction through
technology; program stability; competition; the use of




The GAO is the means by which Congress obtains
information on any number of government programs including
U.S. Navy and Coast Guard Ship Acquisition programs.
Below are three example GAO report abstracts relating to
ship acquisition feedback:





Abstract: This report reviews DOD's implementation of the
Defense Acquisition Improvement Program initiatives.
Areas investigated include: program stability; multiyear
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contracts; economic production rates; and competition.
The report concludes that although the initiatives have
not fully achieved their intended results, there have
been improvements in the acquisition process [24].
Title: Information on the Coast Guard's Polar-Class Icebreaker
Ship Construction Program and Operational Testing (CED-
76-135)
Date: August 1986
Abstract: This report updates a GAO staff study of June 1975
concerning the Coast Guard's procurement of two polar-
class icebreakers. The report discusses: project costs;
delivery schedule; contractor performance on the POLAR
SEA; the status of contractor claims against the
govenrment; and status of contractor claims under the
self-insurance clause of the contract [24],
(c) I ii5.u££.ifiii_Genseal (ig)
The office of the Inspector General can be expected to
audit a ship acquisition project at least once during its life
and will probably do so several times.
8.3 Il£H5._M£.iiia
News media has a large interest in investigating and
reporting on how efficiently U.S. Government agencies invest
huge amounts of government money in ship acquisitions. This
reporting often has been full of accounts of conflicts of
interest, cost overruns, spare parts overpricing, contractor
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fraud, and failures to meet performance goals.
Although many of these reports are exaggerated or based
on poor information, they give the public. Congress and even
the military users of the equipment a negative view of ship
acquioition management.
Newspapers, radio and television feedback can have an
impact on the support and funding of acquisition programs or
future programs. Thus, close observation of this feedback is
considered essential.
An example of news media feedback is a Timg. magazine
article of February 1, 1988, "Mission: Just About Impossible -
the Pentagon's New Procurement Czar Looks for Ways to Save."
Sy mp OS ia / s em in a r s provide a medium in which a dynamic
forum of dialogue with key professionals working in or with
the acquisition community can take place. Key professionals
in attendance usually include senior officials, program
managers, staff officers, researchers from the Department of
Defense and Department of Transportation, federal civilian
agencies, academia, and industry. Ideas, experiences and
views are exchanged and discussed.
Research papers on problem areas in the acquisition
community and how these problem areas are/or might be solved
are combined into one publication for distribution throughout
the acquisition community. This allows other acquisition
personnel who cannot attend the symposium seminar the
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opportunity to obtain acquisition information.
An example symposium is the Federal Acquisition Research
Symposium sponsored by the Department of Defense and the
General Services Administration. This symposium is held
annua 1 ly [ 7 ]
.
8.5 Acalfi-ffiia
Since U.S. Government agencies acquisitions make up a
large portion of U.S. business, colleges and universities
conduct numerous studies and much research on these
acquisitions. U.S. Government agencies recognize the
usefulness of these studies and research and often sponsor
these projects.
This study is an example of an academia study sponsored
by a U.S. Government Agency.
8 . 6 P nii£.riaffi Maiiag.£iil£ Sunjiari Sx5.i£m
The Program Manager's Support System (PMSS) is currently
under development at DSKC. The purpose of the PMSS is to
provide a management tool for managers in a program management
office to assist them in their decision-making process and to
help them execute their project in a more effective and
efficient manner.
The PMSS is intended to support the defense Program
Manager and his/her first echelon staff; for example, the
Chief Engineer, the Plans and Programs Officer, the
Configuration Manager, the Integrated Logistics Support
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Manager, etc. The PMSS also can be utilized by other managers
in the acquisition com munity, for example, by headquarters
level executives, program management officers in major
projects, and field activity managers.
The PMSS will:
be an integrated software system operable on various
hardware systems;
Provide capability to 1) integrate program management
functional areas of responsibility, 2) generate program
alternatives and impacts caused by various management
actions and technical activities, 3) assess these impacts
on the program management responsibilities and ^) utilize
other decision-making support methodologies.
Provide educational tools to facilitate the teaching of
program management functions at educational institutions
involved with defense systems acquisition program
management
.
The PMSS consists of two major parts, functional modules
and the integrated PMSS. Functional modules are software
programs that can be used as stand-alone programs to assist in
program management areas of responsibility such as planning,
acquisition strategy development, program management plan
generation, cost estimating, scheduling, program objectives
memorandum development, budget generation, budget execution
monitoring, financial management, systems engineering,
production planning, integrated logistics support planning,
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test issues identification, Test and Evaluation Master Plan
generation, configuration management, document generation,
document evaluation and monitoring, program office staffing
and organization, etc. These modules support specific
functions of program management operations.
The integrated PMSS will provide a capability called
Program Overview, which shows in a color-coded (green, yellow,
red) mode, the overall status of the program by the program
hierarchical information categories. This provides the
program manager an "instant" visual picture of his/her program
status and quickly pinpoints program areas that require
further management attention. The integrated PMSS will
provide capability for a program manager to tackle
unstructured problems and address "What if...?" and "Should
I...?" questions. The integrated PMSS will integrate the
functions of the functional modules so that a program manager
can look across his/her program and address such questions as
"What is the impact on my program if I get a ^ 0% cut?" or
"What is the impact on my program if the technology I need
slips six months?", or "What is the impact on my program if
there is a schedule delay?", etc. The integrated PMSS looks
across and within all functional areas of responsibility to
assess the impact on the program and help the program manager
develop alternatives for recovery.
The PMSS also will provide executive support aids such as
briefing presentation aids, electronic mail, calendaring
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capability and telephone dialers. It also will include
support capabilities such as word processing, spreadsheets,
data-base managment and decision tools.
The PMSS is not a managment inf or.'na tion system, nor is it
the d e c is i on -make r . It is a manager's tool to assist the
program manager in his/her decision making process. the PMSS
will permit the integration of the user's experience,
judgement and intuition to allow the user to evaluate
available alternatives and ultimately, aid the user to make


























This chapter presents a brief summary of the report, a
comparison of Navy and Coast Guard Acquisition differences,
key study findings, recommendations, and areas considered for
future study.
9.1 SuffifiiailX
The objective of this report is to aid U.S. Government
agencies in making decisions regarding lessons learned
mechanisms with feedback loops. With the tightening of
budgets, it is important that ship acquisition organizations
learn from their mistakes. The intention is to identify the
key lessons learned mechanisms with feedback loops required
for successful ship acquisition (See Section 9.3). The scope
of the study is generic in nature, making it applicable to
both the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy. The study does not
dwell on specific directives, regulations, or terminology. An
additional objective is to provide teaching materials in this
subject area for use with U.S. Coast Guard and Navy officers
at postgraduate training at M.I.T. (and elsewhere).
For any successful changes in present lessons learned






A certain amount of quality resources (manpower and
funds ) .
Continuity of effort (cannot start and stop and then
start again).
Apply case by case application of procedures (Coast
Guard's small size may prevent incorporation of some
ideas) .
The ship acquisition organization is the key organization
in the ship acquisition process. Lessons learned in the ship
acquisition process and on ships acquired must return to the
ship acquisition organization. The ship acquisition
organization must use these lessons learned to improve the
ship acquisition process and the ships they acquire. Chapters
2 through 8 identify the various feedback loops in which
lessons learned are returned to t-he ship acquisition
organization. A summary of the feedback loops discussed in
Chapters 2 through 8 is provided below. Note that many of the
feedback loops do not go -directly to the ship acquisition
organization, but first feedback to another organization which
provides feedback to the ship acquisition organization. An
example of this is that reports from sponsors/users often go
to upper level management prior to reaching the ship
acquisition organization.




- Matrix support groups
- Reviews and boards
- Internal studies
- Informal means
- The acquisition guide
Upper level management provides feedback to the ship
acquisition organization via:
- Regulations, directives and instructions
- Reviews and boards
- Streamlining initiatives
- Direct involvement.
Sponsors/users provide feedback to the ship acquisition
organization via:
- Reports
- Operational testing and evaluations
- Inspections and reviews
- Informal feedback
Formal training organizations provide feedback to the




Research and development organizations provide feedback
to the ship acquisition organization via:
- Research and development efforts
- Design e f forts
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- Developmental testing and evaluations
Industry provides feedback to the ship acquisition
organization via:
- Claims against the government
- Construction changes
- Other acquisition process involvement
- Industry organizations
Other groups provide feedback to the ship acquisition
organization via:
- External studies
- Special external studies
- News roed ia
- Symiposia/seminars
- Academia
- Progranj Manager's Support System
9.2 ^lLLs.Ls.u.Q.s.s. Rs.LiLS.s.n. Lhs. Na:stx ani Lhs. Ci^as-i Cuanl
The Navy's and Coast Guard's ship acquisition
organizations are the two major ship acquisition organizations
of the U.S. Government. There are somie significant
differences between these two ship acquisition organizations.
They inc lud e
:
The Navy's ship acquisition organization is much larger.
Support groups of the Navy's ship acquisition process
consist of much larger organizations. The technical
resources that NAVSEA has available is much greater than
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their Coast Guard counterpart.
The Navy's ship acquisition organization has a large
civilian staff which provides stability to the
organization burdened with numerous military transfers.
The Navy's military and civilian personnel are able to
have career paths directly related to the ship
acquisition process. The Coast Guard, with limited
personnel resources, is unable to have a more structured
ship acquisition career path.
The DOD and DOT organizations, regulations, instructions,
directives, and reviews are considerably different.
The Navy acquires many more ships than the Coast Guard.
Data require Dients and reports are more extensive in the
Navy's ship acquisition process. Coast Guard
requirements are fewer and more flexible.
The Coast Guard holds less central control over field
organ iza t ions .
The Coast Guard ship acquisition organization has
recently developed and has few personnel with a lot of
experience (relative to the Navy).
The sponsor/user of the Navy controls the acquisition
money. In the Coast Guard, the Office of Acquisition is
the money controller.
The Coast Guard can benefit from judicious use of Navy
expertise in ship acquisition. Such activities can range from
informal contact with experienced Navy personnel or a project
-98-

to formal involvement of the Navy in a Coast Guard ship
acquisition .
The first major weapon system for the U.S. Government
started with the authorization for the procurement of six
large frigates by the U.S. War Department in 179^. Seventeen
months later six keels were laid but only three of the
frigates were built due to schedule slippage and cost overruns
[8]. Similar problems with ship acquisitions exist today. A
key to successful ship acquisition is to solicit and utilize
the lessons learned of past programs on present and future
p rograms
.
A number of key feedback points are apparent throughout
this study. They focus on the areas where lessons learned are
considered to have the greatest influence on the ship
acquisition process. This section identifies the key lessons
learned mechanisms with feedback loops required for successful
ship acquisition. Additionally, comjments are made concerning
present or possible use by current ship acquisition
organizations. The discussion below follows the sequence of
Chapters 2 through 8.
Internal feedback within the ship acquisition
organization (Chapter 2):
The operational world does not remain static. Systems
must be upgraded. New systems are brought on-line to meet
changing roles and rriissions. Such developments must be
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anticipated, planned for, and incorporated into a developing
system.. It is inaccurate to expect a system to D:eet
operational expectations when it goes on-line if no provisions
are made for the dynamics of the situation.
A major consideration in the ship acquisition process is
to identify c os t -c ap ab i 1 i t y tradeoffs with a view toward
elimination of those performance capabilities having marginal
return on investment. The need for review and assessment of
incremental improvements in operational performance as a
function of additional resource investment, in terms of non-
recurring development and recurring life cycle costs, should
continue throughout the entire life of of the program. The
ship acquisition organization is the leading advocate for
conducting this continuing analysis and evaluation for ship
acquisitions .
Comment -- The ship acquisition organization is a focal
point for many of the lessons learned mechanisnis with
returning feedback loops. The ship acquisition organization
must use these lessons learned to improve the ship acquisition
process and the ships they acquire. Specifically, they must
identify and correct recurring deficiencies and improve on
existing systems.
It is best to keep formal and informal feedback loops to
the ship acquisitions organization simple and direct. An
example is the technical organization of the ship acquisition
organization. The technical organization requires inputs from
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the sponsor/user on any problems with current shipboard
systems. The technical organization uses these lessons
learned to improve shipboard systems and in turn passes
information to the design organization to incorporate into new
ship designs. The flow of information from the sponsor/user
to the technical organization and from the technical
organization to the design organization must be easily
accomplished through simple and direct communications.
An excellent lesson learned mechanism with feedback loop
is the acquisition guide. NAVAIR procedure of collecting and
periodically disseminating acquisition lessons learned.
Although presently not used by any ship acquisition
organization, the acquisition guide is a low cost, small
manpower operation that results in a wealth of information on
the acquisition process. The NAVAIR acquisition guide is
currently run by one person as a collateral duty. However,
benefits are received by many throughout the NAVAIR
organization. The Coast Guard is currently developing
procedures to collect and disseminate lessons learned related
to ship acquisition.
Upper level managemicnt feedback (Chapter 3):
The ship acquisition organization must give upper level
management special attention. Decisions made by the upper
level management can directly affect any ship acquisition
program. Ship acquisition organizations must continuously





Comment -- Both the Navy and Coast Guard ship acquisition
organizations presently give upper level management adequate
attention .
Sponsor/User feedback (Chapter 4):
Perhaps the greatest values in the review process are
getting the project back on track, providing management with
renewed confidence, and assessing the health of the project.
Inspections, reviews and boards are outstanding methods of
obtaining lessons learned. Inspections, reviews and boards
are conducted to provide objective progress measurement and
feedback on the ship acquisition process. Classic engineering
requires feedback fron the operator to the responsible
engineer regarding the performance of the equipment or system
in question.
Comments -- Inspections, reviews and boards- internal to
the ship acquisition are very useful. However, inspections,
reviews, and boards separate from the ship acquisition
organization provide an impartial view often needed to
critique a program. The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey
does an outstanding job of inspecting as an organization
separate from the acquisition progress. The Coast Gurad has
no Board of Inspection and Survey equivalent.
Formal training feedback (Chapter 5):
A major method to get past lessons learned and new
innovative ideas into ship acquisition process is through
-102-

schools and use of appropriate teaching materials. Defense
acquisition will improve only in direct relation to the
availability and application of sufficient numbers of well-
qualified professional oersonnel.
Comment -- Use of ship acquisition personnel after
successful ship acquisition tours as instructors of new ship
acquisition personnel could be very beneficial. This
instruction would be separate from normal defense acquisition
training due to its specialization.
Additionally, apr)ropriate training materials are
necessary. The majority of the acquisition teaching materials
and courses are aimed at the acquisition of objects that can
be mass-produced (e.g. missiles, planes). Courses and case
studies with a ship acquisition view are needed. Interactive
computer programs may also prove valuable.
Research and development feedback (Chapter 6):
Testing and evaluations provide key feedback on the
ability of the ship to meet desired goals. Upper level
management and the ship acquisition organization use results
of testing and evaluations to help make decisions on
commitment of additional resources to a program or to advance
it from one acquisition phase to another.
Comments -- A key to obtaining useful information from
testing and evaluations is ensuring the tests are conducted
under realistic environmental conditions. Current tests are
often not tested under realistic conditions. Thus, upper
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level management and ship acquisitions organizations decisions
are made using incorrect data.
Industry feedback (Chapter 7):
Industry provides important feedback to the ship
acquisition organization. Research and development, design,
technical, financial, integrated logistics and construction
matrix support groups all receive important lessons learned
from their interaction with industry.
Comments -- The key to maximum use of industry feedback
is keeping the information flowing freely. Thus, each matrix
support group needs to establish contact points with industry.
To ensure future use of lessons learned from industry requires
an organizational effort by each matrix support group. An
effort already in use is the NAVSEA office which compiles
statistics on claims, provides feedback on lessons learned
froDi prior claims and conducts contract management reviews
once every three years at each SUPSHIP. Industry involvement
in the ship design process has demonstrated useful results.
Similar efforts by other matrix support groups would also be
beneficial .
Other feedback (Chapter 8):
The Naxal Siiia ZLQ.Q.]iLs.ms.n.t>. Zlq.q.s.s.s. Stusii: of July 1978 [i]
is an example of an extensive study that addresses the
avoidance of claims against the Navy by private U.S.
shipbuilders. Do the ship acquisition personnel of today
benefit from these past studies on ship acquisition?

There are numerous amounts of lessons learned information
from external studies, new media, symposia/seminars and
academia. The problem is the amount of information is too
large and broad based. Most ship acquisition organization
professionals do not have the time required to review this
enormous amount of feedback.
Comment -- The ship acquisition organization needs an
overall coordinator who will screen, condense and route this
lar^e amount of feedback to the personnel in the ship
acquisition organization who need it. Technical information
goes to the technical people, contract information goes to the
contract division, etc. This information coordinator would
have to have a good understanding of the basic ship
acquisition process. A system similar to the Program
Manager's Support System to organize the information for
future ship acquisition organization personnel would also be
use fu 1
.
Some of the recommendations made throughout this section
would stretch the current personnel limits of the already
under-staffed ship acquisitions of the Navy and Coast Guard.
However, the benefits of some of these recommendations may
well be worth the cost. An example is the use of successful
ship acquisition personnel is the training of new ship
acquisition personnel. Presently, no extensive formal
training is accomplished by former successful ship acquisition
personnel except on-the-job training. Can you imagine pilot
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training being accomplished without the use of successful
pilots? Although costly, the use of successful ship
acquisition personnel in the training of new ship acquisition
personnel could easily pay for itself over time. Possibly,
the use of successful ship acquisition personnel could be
accomplished by part-time assignments in these training
efforts .
The focus of this study is to help U.S. Government
agencies in identifying and developing ship acquisition lesson
learned mechanisms with feedback loops. A generic approach
was taken so that conclusions would be applicable to both the
Navy and the Coast Guard.
Throughout this study, numerous topics for future studies
were discovered. They include:
Expand the current focus to take a more detailed look at
the acquisition of aircraft and other major weapon
systems by U.S. Government agencies.
Look at how success is measured in ship acquisition
programs
.
Examine the research and development efforts of ship
acquisitions programs from before program initiation
through ship acceptance.




Investigate the success of streamlining efforts in the
ship acquisition process.
Develop more case studies of actual ship acquisitions to
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LIST OF PERTINENT DIRECTIVES
This Appendix contains a list of pertinent DOD and Navy
d irec t i ves .
DOCUMENT TITLE DATE(D.M.Y)
DOD
DOD DIR 1130.2 Management and Control of 26.01.83
Engineering and Technical Services
DOD DIR ^000.26 Post Production Support 19 .08.86
DOD DIR M105.62 Selection of Contractual Services for 6.01.76
Major Defense Systems
DOD DIR 4105.68 Defense Acquisition Research 30.09.85
DOD DIR 4151.1 Use of Contractor and Govt Resources 15.08.82
for Management of Material
DOD INST 4200.15 Manufacturing Technology Program 24.05.85
DOD INST 4245.3 Design to Cost 6 .04.83
DOD INST 4245.4 Acquisition of Nuc lear-Survivable
Systems
2.09.83
DOD INST 4245.6 Defense Production Management 19.01 .84
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DOD INST ^2^5.9 Competitive Acquisition 17 .08.84
DOD DIR 5000.1 Major System Acquisition 12.03 .86
DOD DIR 5000.2 Major System Acquisition Procedures 12.03.86
DOD DIR 5000.3 Test and Evaluation 12.03.86
DOD MAN 5000.3 Test and Evaluation Master Plan 1.10.86
(TEMP) Guidelines
DOD DIR 5000.29 Management of Computer Resources in 26.04.76
Major Defense Systems
DOD INST 5000.31 Tactical Embedded Computers 24.11 .76
DOD DIR 5000.38 Productivity Readiness Reviews 24.01.79
DOD DIR 5000.39 Acquisition and Management of ILS 17.11.83
for Systems and Equipment
DOD DIR 5000.40 Reliability and Maintainability 8.07.80
DOD DIR 5000.43 Acquisition Streamlining 15.01.86
DOD INST 5010.19 Configuration Management 1.05.79
DOD DIR 5126.34 Defense Procurement Management 11.08.77
Review Program




DOD INST 7000. 3G Preparation and Review of Selected 20.05.80
Acquisition Reports
DOD INST 7000.10 Contract Cost Performance, Funds 3.12.79
Status and Cost/Schedule Status neports
DOD INST 7000.11 Contractor Cost Data Reporting
(CCDR)
DOD INST 7220.31 Unit Cost Reports
DOD INST 7220.32 Defense Acquisition Executive
Summary
SECNAV

















Proper Use of Contractor Personnel 23.06.76




Effective Acquisition of Navy 16.01.87
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Engineering and Technical Services 23.01.94
Defense Productivity Management 17.03.86
Use of Contractor and Government 3.10.84
Resources for Management of Material
System Acquisition 8.04.83
Acquisition and Management of
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
Management of Embedded Computer
Resources in DON Systems
Navy Program Decision Meetings
3 .03 .86
1 1 .06.79
1 1 .06 .79
Contract Cost Performance, Funds 17.03.80
Status and Cost/Schedule Status Reports
Contractor Cost Performance 14.04.78
Measurement for Selected Acquisitions
Nuclear Survivability of Navy and 28.01.84
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Test and Evaluation 23.08.83
Department of the Navy Integrated
Logistics Support System
6.1 1 .72
Integrated Logistics Support Review 16.07. 86
and Appraisal
Navy Configuration Management System 22.09.8^
Engineering and Technical Support - 19. 08. 81
Management and Control
RDT&E Acquistion Procedures 10 .05 .86
Integrated Logistic Support in the 30.01.87
Acquistion Process
Navy Training Simulator and Device 9.04.85
Acquistion
Determining Manpower Personnel, and 12.08.85
Training Required for Acquisitions





Development of Naval Ship
Characteristics




















Reliability of Naval Material 22.04.77
Operational Availability of Weapon 21.01.81
Systems and Equipments - Definition
and Policy




































Test and Evaluation 1 1 .01 .86
Policy on Ship Testing 31 .05.84
ILS Plan Preparation Guide 28.06.85
Defense Standards and Specifications 16.03. 82
Program
DoD Parts Control Program 3 .06.83
Application and Tailoring of 26.01.85
Specifications Standards and Related
Documents
Non-Government Specifications and 14.08.80
Standard s























Technical Manual Management Program 7.07.82
Service Contracting and Contract 31.12.86
Support Services Authorization in
NAVSEA and Supporting Activities
Procurement Request Processing 31.05.79
Development, Approval and Endorsement 6.05.85
of Acquistion Plans
Sole Source Acquistion in Excess of 24.02.83
$250,000
Award Fee Type Contracts - Minimum 31.05.83
Requirements Related Thereto
Policy on Government Furnished 7.02.86
Material for New Construction and Conversion
Extraordinary Contractual Actions 5.05.86
Logistics Management Procedures for 28.06.85
Configuration Changes Installed Outside
of Depot Level Availabilities
NAVSEAINST Expanded Ship Work Breakdown 13.02.85
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NAVSEAINST
4800.2
Structure for Ships, Ship Systems,
and Combat Systems

















Acquistion Program Appraisal Within 1.06.83
NAVSEA
Naval Sea Systems Command Ship
Acquistion Policy Manual
Ship Project Directive System •
Implementation of
Rough Order of Magnitude Cost
Estimate for SCN Appropriation
28 .07 .81
19 .06.84
Control of the Acquistion Program 26.05.85
Requirements Document
Proper Use of Contractor Personnel 25.11.85
2.01 .86
Classi f ica tin of Shipbuilding and 3.06.80
Conversion, Navy Cost Estimates for
Ships
Selected Acquisition Report, System 1.08.81









Design Reviews of NAVSEA Acquisition 13.05.83
Programs - Policy and Procedures for
Reports of Trials, Material 28.11.84
Inspections and Surveys Conducted by
the Board of Inspection and Survey
INSERVINST
4730 . 1 IF
INSERVINST
4730 .19
Preparation of Deficiency Forms
Summary of Recurring Deficiencies
Noted During Trials and Material
Inspections of Surface Ships
10.06 .83
1 1 .06 .76
0MB










MSH CASE STUDY (DRAFT)
This case study was written by Henry S. Marcus, asociate
professc, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The study
was written as the basis for class discussion rather than to
illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an
administrative situation. The majority of the case study is
taken verbatim from the General Accounting Office report "DOD
Acquisition, Case Study of the Navy Minesweeper Hunter
Program", August 25, 1986. Also used were: "Naval Ship Design:
The Shipbuilders' Emerging New Role" by Robert A. Johnson,
from Naxal Ellg.ia£.£C5. ilau.11112.1 May 1985, for a verbatim
description of the proposed vessels; Requests for Proposals;
internal Naval documents; and interviews.
THE O.S. NAVY MINESWEEPER HDNTER PROGRAM
ORIGIN_OF_PROGRAM
In February 1980, the Naval Sea Systems Command was
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations to initiate cost and




coastal requirement. U.S. and foreign shipbuilders were
requested to submit proposals to design and build the new
class of Minesweeper Hunter ships. The primary mission will be
locating and sweeping or neutralizing mines --whether they be
acoustic, magnetic or contact mines--in the coastal waters,
harbors and bays of the United States. They may operate in
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conjunction with both airborne mine countermeasures
helicopters and mine countermeasure ships in coastal waters.
Additional contingency mission tasks include route surveys
tasks, channel conditioning, underwater search, search and
rescue, and collection of hydrographic and oceanographic data.
The Navy investigated different low cost designs of
minehunters of varying capability tailored for the coastal
mission .
DEIELOPMENT QF THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY
Although the program officially began in February 1980,
it was not until October 1982 that the first acquisition
strategy was approved. The second program manager stated that
there were earlier drafts of acquisition plan approaches, but,
since nothing was decided at the time, there was no need to
finalize an acquisition strategy.
According to the first program manager, the original
acquisition strategy that he had developed was. never finalized
because the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Logistics) directed some changes. He stated that the original
plan had been basically the same as that for the mine
countermeasure lead ship and called for (1) In-house
development of concept design, (2) assistance for ship system
design support from industry shipbuilders, (3) a single
contractor for design finalization and lead ship construction
under a cost type contract, (^) a gap year in 1985 to make
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final changes and adjustments, and (5) delivery of the first
production ship in 1987. The first prograic manager stated that
in March 1981, when the strategy was being developed, it was
general Navy practice to use cost type contracts and ship
design support contractor^ for lead ship development. He noted
that concept design had been completed and the project had
moved as far as preliminary design under the original
acquisition approach.
In December 1981, the Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command convened a Ship Acquisition Improvement Panel to
discuss results of the concept design. The first program
manager stated that the estimated cost for each ship was over
$100 million. However, this figure was considered too high by
top Navy officials, who had determined that the ship should
not cost more than about $75 million. The first programi
manager stated that it was more a question of what was
affordable at the highest Navy levels than a deliberate effort
to set a price cap. He noted that at this point the
a f
f
ordabi 1 i ty issue was driving the ship's design.
On January 22, 1982, the Secretary of the Navy expressed
concern that the operational requirements be reexamined for
cost and performance trade-offs and that results of the review
be provided by March 15, 1982. He also expressed concern that
the Navy had not adequately examined foreign ship designs and
their use of glass reinforced plastic hulls. The Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) restated
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these concerns to the Naval Sea System Command's Deputy
Commander for Ship Design and Integration at a meeting on
January 28, 1982. The Deputy Commander related the results of
this meeting to the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.
On March 16, 1982, an Aci-iuisition Review Board was
conducted and several options were discussed, including
overseas procurement and licensing of foreign minesweeper
concepts for production in the United States. Equipment
subsystem procurement, inc lud ing engine and propeller systems
selections, as well as hull material alternatives were also
discussed. On March 31, 1982, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) requested a further review
of alternative which was scheduled for April 13, 1982.
ORIGINAL PLAN CANCELLED
The first program manager stated that as a result of the
April 1982 meeting with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics), the original acquisition plan
was rejected and the concept design phase was extended to
accommodate a new strategy.
The first program manager explained that the strategy was
changed because the program office was having difficulty in
meeting cost objectives. He stated that as a result of cost
cutting efforts, five different design alternatives were
developed, with estimated prices for both wood and glass-
reinforced plastic. The program manager stated these proposals
were also evaluated as too costly and that the Assistant
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Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) directed
that a technical assessment team be organized in May 1982 to
evaluate the capabilities of the mine hunters of our European
allies .
The overall approach of the new strategy was to have the
shipbuilders design the ship so that it did not exceed the
cost ceiling. To meet the cost objectives, requirements were
tailored and general specifications for surface ships were
selectively waived. Specifically, the ship's operational
requirements and performance capability were tailored in the
areas of minesweeping depth, speed, mission duration, and on-
board administrative/ maintenance support to meet the coastal
mission .
The strategy used a competitive elimination approach, in
which every qualified shipbuilder was welcome to compete at
the onset, using their own design,- a foreign design, a
previous Naval Sea Systems Command feasibility design, or any
combination thereof. Contractors were to be progressively
elminated in a three-phase -process.
The first program manager stated that about this time he
requested retirement. In May 1982, he left the task of
compliance with the new program directions, including
development of the acquisition strategy, to his deputy. The
program manager added that he sent his deputy, who had been
involved with the development of the Saudi Arabian




The first program manager stated that it was generally
believed that the new acquisition approach was better suited
to acquiring the ship within budget and schedule constraints.
However, he added that either strategy would have resulted in
a vessel which met Navy mission requirements.
ACQUISITION STRATEGY APPROVED AND NEW PROGRAM MANAGER ASSIGNED
In a May 27, 1982 memorandum to the Secretary of the
Navy, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations discussed the
Minesweeper Hunter platform, equipment, and payload
acquisition. He also offered for consideration the option of
having U.S. builders submit proposals which would satisfy U.S.
Navy top level requirement needs through the use of a Naval
Sea Systems Command design, or a foreign design (via license
to produce). The memorandum recommended against an "as is"
direct procurement of a foreign mine hunter, stating the Naval
Sea Systems Command was working toward an excellent design
that would meet all Navy requirements and capitalize on
foreign technology. However, it was pointed out that the
design would likely exceed the Chief of Naval Operations
revised cost objective of $65 million per ship. The deputy
program manager stated that the new strategy was an attempt to
incorporate the foreign technology desired by the Assistant
Secretary without encountering the legal difficulties
associated with direct foreign procurement.
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The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Logistics), in a memoranduni dated June 16, 1982, concurred
with this approach as presenting the best opportunity to meet
both the Navy's operational requirements and its financial
ceiling. He requested that to enable a fiscal year 1984 st^rt,
an acquisition plan be completed no later than July 15, 1982.
The memorandum further required that industry be requested to
bring innovative and cost conscious capabilities to bear in
meeting the requirements in the shortest period of time and at
an affordable cost.
When the first program manager retired from the Navy in
1982, he stated that his replacement, who was knowledgeable in
the mine warfare area and was intimiately familiar with the
potential builders, was an excellent choice for the job.
The second program manager, a Navy captain, was
originally commissioned an unrestricted line officer and
served in a variety of positions aboard destroyers. In 1966,
he converted to engineering duty officer when he received a
master's degree and a naval engineers degree from the
Massachusset ts Institute of Technology. Before his assignment
to this program, he served in acquisition related assignments
for 13 years. His assignments included project officer for
amphibious ships, a 2 year tour as a Naval Sea Systems Command
technical director developing acquisition strategies and
plans, 5 months at the Defense Systems Management College, 1
year at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and 4
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years as a supervisor of shipbuilding.
The second program manager did not assume his new
responsibilities until August 1982, after 2 months of mine
c ou n t e rmea su r es training at the Mine Warfare Command in
Charleston, South Carolina. He stated that when he reported,
the program was in a state of transition as not all senior
Navy people were in agreement on having industry design and
build the Minesweeper Hunter. However, he stated that by
October 1982 a decision was made.
The second program manager inherited the revised
acquisition approach and thus was basically tasked with
implementing a top level strategy decision. He stated that the
basic premise of the acquisition strategy was that it would be
competitive and that his task was to divide the acquisition
package into logical, competitive steps. He also stated that
he reviewed the mission need to ensure that it would be
satisfied by the strategy and recommended that the
requirements document be carefully defined in order to meet
the constrained resource requirement. This recommendation was
accepted .
A new contracting officer was assigned to the program
office in August 1982. His background included a
bus in es s /pub 1 ic administration degree with 1 year of work
toward a master's degree in business ad min s t ra t i on
,
plus 11
years contracting experience in various shipbuilding and
overhaul programs. He divided his time between four Navy ship
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programs. In his opinion, this arrangement did not present
problems in completing the work required for the program.
A preliminary inquiry letter was released to potential
bidders on October 1, 1982, to solicit interest. The
acquisition strategy for the Minesweeper Hunter was prepared
by the program office and initially approved by the Naval Sea
Systems Command Deputy Commander for Acquisition on October 5,
1982. Requirements for the ship were approved by the Chairman
of the Ships Characteristics and Improvement Board on November
9, 1982. On March 18, 1983, the acquisition strategy received
final approval from the Chief of Naval Materiel.
Navy guidance required lead ship acquisition in fiscal
year 1984 at a ceiling price of $65 million, $31 million of
which was allocated for the shipbuilder's detailed design and
construction contract. The cost for government furnished
equipment, escalation. Navy efforts and change orders were not
included in the $31 million for design and construction. The
lead ship award also contained an option for four other ships
in fiscal year 1986 and four in fiscal year year 1987. Two
additional groups of four ships each are scheduled to be
competitively awarded in fiscal years 1988 and 1989 to meet
the approved planning goal of 17 ships.
According to the acquisition strategy, the cost and





Development of the source selection plan was a joint
effort on the part of the program office and the contracting
officer with the program office assuming the lead development
responsibility. In September 1982, the procurement process
started for a two-phase design strategy under fixed-price
competitive contract terms. Both the program manager and the
contracting officer stated that in considering contract type,
they were involved in risk assessment. However, the second
contracting officer stated that he is ultimately responsible
for deter rrining the contract type. He also stated that
recently the Secretary of the Navy has favored fixed-price
con t rac ts .
To determine industry interest in the acquisition, on
October 1, 1982, the contracting officer sent a preliminary
inquiry letter to the sources considered capable of satisfying
the requirement.
The competitive solicitation was prepared by the
contracting officer in conjunction with the program office.
The solicitation and proposed contract were then reviewed by
the Naval Sea Systems Command General Counsel. A draft was
made available to prospective offerors in October 1982 and an
industry briefing was conducted on October 26, 1982, to
solicit remarks, questions and concerns. A first draft source
selection plan was promulgated on November 9, 1982.
After a notice of procurement appeared in the Cafflffi£i:2.£
Bu.£ill£.££ Dailil* A ship design request for proposal (RFP) was
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issued by the Naval Sea Systems Command to industry on
December 7, 1982.
The request for proposal was subsequently provided to all
shipbuilders or design agents (foreign or domestic) who
requested it.
The contracting officer held a conference for all
prospective offerors on January 12, 1983, to respond to their
questions and clarify the Navy's requirements.
Both the second program manager and the contracting
officer stated that the development of the request for
proposal was a joint effort of the program and contracting
offices. The program manager stated that he monitored the
development of the request for proposal to ensure compliance
with the requirements and the acquisition strategy and to
ensure that no part of the proposal was released without his
review. The contracting officer stated- that he developed the
business t e rms /c ond i t i on s and evaluation criteria sections
with input from the program manager and basically reviewed and
modified remaining sections for compliance with existing
regulations .
On February 10, 1983, the Secretary of the Navy delegated
source selection authority to the Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command, and the program was designated a high priority
program, with the Secretary of the Navy as the final decision
authority. The Chairman and members of the Source Selection
Advisory Coucil were designated on March 9, 1983. Two
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additional advisors were added on April 12, 1983. According to
the November 11, 198^, Minesweeper Hunter Proposal Analysis
Report, the Chairmen of the Source Selection Advisory Council
and the Source Selection Evaluation Board attempted to retain
the same personnel throughout the selection process in order
to maintain continuity of policy and technical evaluation. The
report states that substantially the same personnel conducted
all the competitive phase I to III evaluations.
PHASE I
On March 15, 1983, six proposals were received from the
following offerors:
1. Bell Aerospace Textron, New Orleans, La.
2. Marine Power and Equipment Company, Seattle, Wash.
3. Marinette Marine Corporation, Marinette, Wis.
h. Peterson Builders, Incorporated, Sturgeon Bay, Wis.
5. The Willard Company, Fountain Valley, Calif.
6. van der Giessen de Noord , The Netherlands
The second program manager considered this a good
response because only 15 companies out of over 150 attending
the initial bidder conference requested proposal information.
He explained that proposal development is a costly process and
only serious contenders make the investment.
All proposals were formally evaluated and the results
summarized by the Source Selection Advisory Council in the
Proposal Analysis Report dated April 6, 1983. The selection
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was based on evaluation of the below listed categories which
appear in descending order of importance as stated in the RFP.
Bidders are aware of relative importance but not weighting
factors .
category a. Approach to Phase I Contract Design
Category b. Approach to Phase II Contract Design and
Continuation
Category c. Management Capability (Design and Construction)
Category d. Experience (Design and Construction)
Category e. Fac i 1 i t ie s /P e r s on n e 1 Capability (Design and
Construe t ion
)
Category f. Approach to Cost and Schedule Control (Design and
Cons true t ion
Category g. Price (although in this case, a price of $250,000
had already been set)
Selections were made by the source selection authority on
April 8, and four $250,000 fixed price contracts for phase I




Peterson Builders, Incorporated, and
van der Giessen de Noord.
Each shipbuilder proposed a unique concept to meet the
MSH requirements: Bell Aerospace Textron proposed an aluminum-
or glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) variant surface effect ship
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(SES) based on the SES-200 design; the Marinette Marine
Corporation proposed a GRP monohull based on the Italian
Lfecici class minehunter; Peterson Builders proposed a wooden
hull MSH based on an MSO design; van der Giessen der Noord,
teaming up with Todd Pacific Shipyard Corp., Seattle Division,
proposed the GRP Tx:i]2.ailiii.£ class minehunter as the basis for
their design.
During the period from April 15, 1983 to August 15, 1983,
each of the four contractors developed their phase I design
using the requirements, statement of work, and other guidance
included in the contracts. The Naval Sea Systems Command
maintained a "hands-off" policy during this period as called
for in the acquisition strategy. However, contractors were
permitted to submit formal questions regarding terms of the
contract requirements. Responses were provided in written form
only, and were given to all four competitors without divulging
the source of the question. Each contractor was also given
access to the Naval Sea Systems Command's technical library.
Under the terms of the contracts, the Naval Sea Systems
Command conducted a 2 day design review at each of the four
sipbuilders' facilities from June 13 to 29i 1983f and a second
review at the Naval Sea Systems Command from August 1 to 4,
1983.
Zha.a.s. II
On August 15, 1983, the four competitors submitted their
phase I design data packages and phase II proposals. These

subiTiissions were evaluated from August 15 to September 23,
1983, by the Source Selection Evaluation Board, which
conducted the technical evaluation and, from September 26 to
29, by the Source Selection Advisory Council, which reviewed
the Board's findings and conducted separate deliberations. The
evaluation categories for continuation into Phase II are
listed below in descending order of importance:
Category a. Phase I Contract Design Package
Category b. Approach to Phase II Contract Design and
Continuation
Category c. Management Capability (Design and Construction)
Category d. Approach to Cost and Schedule C on t ro 1 /P r ic
e
Estimate (Design and Construction)
Category e. Fa c i 1 i t i e s / P e
r
sonn e 1 Capability (Design and
Construe t ion )
Category f. Experience (Design and Construction)
Category g. Approach to Logistics Support
Category h. Price Phase II (although a price of $1 million had
a Iready been set)
Because of its concerns about deficiencies and errors in
the proposals, the Advisory Council decided that before it
made its selection, it would hold discussions with all four
offerors and review their best and final offers. On September
30, 1983, the offerors were notified that such discussions
would be held. The Naval Sea Systems Command provided written
formal questions on October H, 1983, with discussions
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occurring between October 5 and 1^. Best and final offers were
received on October 18, 1983. The Board conducted evaluations
from October 19 to 22, 1983, and the Council was reconvened
October 2M to 25, 1983* The final scores were evaluated and
the Council's report was prepared and presented to the Source
Selection Authority (SSA) on October 26, 1983- The SSA
selected Bell Aerospace and Marinette Marine to perform phase
II contract design. On November 2, 1983, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) conducted
an informal program review of the selection with
representatives from the Chief of Naval Operations and Naval
Materiel Command in attendance. On the same day, firm fixed-
price options for $1 million each were exercised with the two
cont rac tors .
Both contractors planned to utilize foreign GRP
technology. Bell Aerospace Textron proposed a GRP SES,
changed from their previous aluminum design. Most of the ship
structure was to be of foam core GRP-sandwich construction as
employed on the Swedish L-aniS-aci. class MCM vessels built by
Kar Iskrona var vet AB of Karlskrona, Sweden. The ship proposed
by Bell was based on a lengthened version of the SES-200 (189-
ft. length overall and a 39-ft. beam) SES hull.
The Marinette Marine Corporation continued to develop
their l62-ft. LOA, 36-ft. beam GRP monocoque hull ship based
on the L££i£.l class designed and built by Intermarine S.p.A.
of La Spezia, Italy. This ship displaced about 600 tons and

utilized two V o i
t
h-Sc hne id e r cycloidal propellers for main
propu Is ion .
Plia££ III
On January 20, 198^, the phase III request for detailed
design and lead ship construction proposals was issued to the
two phase II contractors. It required delivery of proposals
on July 2, 198^, and stated that the contract would be awarded
for the proposal that was most advantageous to the government,
price and other factors considered.
Risk Analxfiifi ilali.£.ii Yartatim Ircin A^aiiisitian Stnaisg-Xs-
2a^-82^ ga Jiilx liSiu RfeiL. 21
The major risk areas are considered to be schedule (low
risk), ship cost (low to medium risk), technical development
(low risk), and follow ship production competition (medium
risk). The acquisition strategy has been structured to
respond to these risk factors.
Schedule risk was originally considered to be high as a
result of program initiation in August 1982 with ASN (S&L)
directed lead ship award in FY 84. With only 24 months
available to conduct concept design, preliminary design,
contract design, a competitive LSDD&C solicitation, evaluation
and contract award, meeting the schedule was a high risk.
However, as shown previously all milestones to date have been
completed, up to and including receipt of the LSDD&C
proposals. The LSDD&C contract award will occur during
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September 198^. Accordingly, schedule risk has been
downgraded to low.
Because of the CNO-directed lead ship cost ceiling of
$65M, the competing contractors' proposals require a design
development limitation that lead ship detail design and
construction not exceed $31M based on December 1983 dollars.
($65 M minus Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and other
government expenses). Both LSDD&C competitors indicate this
target will be met. However, development of the low magnetic,
high shock minehunter has enough unknown factors to be
considered a medium cost risk. Evaluation of the LSDD&C price
proposals of the competing offerors prior to lead ship
contract award will further refine the overall program cost
risk which is considered to be low to mediun: at this time.
Technical risk associated with the development of the
competing ship designs is low. Each of the proposed designs
is based on proven foreign applications. Marinette Marine
Corporation is proposing a Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP)
monohull design incorporating the proven Italian L£.iii.£.i Class
technology while Bell Aerospace Textron plans a GRP Surface
Effect Ship using Swedish minehunter GRP hull technology.
Additionally, the HM&E and combat systems will be installed in
other ship classes, primarily MCM, prior to MSH requirements.
Production risk will be minimized through the use of
Production Readiness Reviews (PRR). A PRR Plan will be
submitted to SEA 90 (the Navy's Acquisition Review
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Directorate) for approval in accordance with NAVSEAINST i]800.2
such that all PRR's will be completed and reports, identifying
risk areas and corrective actions, submitted prior to the
start of fabrication of the lead ship by the winning
contractor. The PRR Plan will also address PRR's for follow-
on production in the event a second source is selected.
In accordance with standard DOD policy, follow-ship
production is intended to be competitive in FY 88 and FY 89.
However, the uniqueness of the competing designs and
investment in production tooling and molds, coupled with the
relatively small program (17 ships), may result in little or
no interest from a second source shipbuilder. Therefore, the
risk of not having outyear competition is medium.
The acquisition strategy also provided for competition
during the follow-on construction of 16 ships in accordance
with standard Department of Defense policy as mandated by
section 797 of the Defense Appropriation Act, which requires
either a plan for competition during production or
certification that quantities are not sufficient to warrant
such action. The current program manager stated that although
the planned l6-ship follow-on production quantity is a
questionable range for more than one builder, a second source
contractor is still an option; therefore, there will be at
least the threat of competition. The strategy for
follow-on production was altered from one that gave the lead
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ship contractor the option to construct four ships and kept an
alternate contractor in competition for some of the follow-on
vessels to one that allowed the Navy to extend to the lead
shipbuilder options for eight ships under fixed price
incentive contract terms (fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year
1987 groups of four ships each). Industry competition is
planned for ship construction after FY 87. Program officials
stated that the arrangements to involve a second contractor
early in the follow-on construction were dropped as
impractical because of significant design differences between
competitors .
The revised acquisition strategy states that although the
Navy preferred to compete the fiscal year 1987 ships,
competition would be a high risk because of uncertainties
about the detailed design at the time of solicitation and
award
.
The evaluation categories for phase III were:
Category a. Price, the total target price for nine ships (Life
cycle costs, delivery schedules and projected escalation
costs were not evaluated.)
Category b. Contract design, the proposed contract designs and
integrated logistic support as presented in various
technical drawings, specifications, and reports
Category c. Approach to detail design and construction
The evaluation was to give consideration not only to the
proposed design and management capabilities of the offerors,
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but to the assessment of technical and management risk. The
request for proposal stated that categories a and b were
substantially more important than category c, and although
weights were assigned to each category (but not known to the
offerors), factors and items within each category were not
individually weighted.
As in phase I, the Naval Sea Systems Command maintained a
"hands-off" policy during the phase II design period, although
it responded to officially submitted questions. Design
reviews were conducted in January, April, and June of 1984,
and on July 2, 1984, both contractors submitted their phase II
data packages and phase III proposals.
During the period July 2 to 28, 1984, the Source
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) conducted technical and
management evaluations. Over 30 separate evaluators were
used, each a specialist in technical, m.anagement, integrated
logistics support, or ship construction disciplines. The
contract design packages from both contractors were reviewed
and evaluated. These packages consisted of detailed ship
specifications, design drawings, and technical reports, as
well as numerous other proposal documents containing planning
schedules, foreign licenses, description of intended
facilities, manpower, management, and subcontracting.
Based on the Evaluation Board's technical and management
reports, the Advisory Council determined that each proposal
contained numerous deficiencies. As a result, on August 8,
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1984, the contracting officer sent questions to both
contractors. Ninety-one questions were addressed to Marinette
Marine Corporation and 138 to Bell Aerospace, covering such
technical areas as drawings, arrangements, structures, noise,
stability, magnetic signature, and propulsion. In addition,
there were questions about management, support, business terms
and conditions, and price.
The questions were discussed with Bell on August 13, 1984
and with Marinette Marine Corporation on August 15, 1984.
Responses to the questions were received on August 22, 1984.
The Naval Sea Systems Command reopened discussions on August
28 for 1 day to discuss the issue of technical manuals. Best
and final offers were received on August 30, 1984.
From August 30 to September 5, 1984, the Evaluation Board
evaluated the best and final offers. On September 6 to 7,
1984, the Advisory Council reconvened and reviewed those
evaluations. The Advisory Council stated that based on
offeror responses, almost all of the Navy's major design
concerns had been addressed and that they viewed both design
offers as acceptable.
Although both proposals were acceptable, the Advisory
Council and the Evaluation Board had some technical and
performance concerns with one offer. At this point, prices
for all nine ships were disclosed to the Advisory Council and
tentative numerical scores were assigned to both proposals
based on the technical evaluations of the SSEB.
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Because of technical concerns in both proposals, the
Advisory Council concluded that a second round of discussions
would be required. Accordingly, questions were prepared and
reviewed on September 12, 1984 and released to the contractors
by the contracting officer on September 14, 1984. Discussions
were held with one offeror on September 18, but the other
declined to participate. Responses to the questions as well
as the second best and final offers were received on September
24, 1984. The contract would be fixed price incentive. The
share ratio would be 60/40 with a ceiling price of 135? of the
target price. Marinette Marine bid $224,490,008, Bell
Aerospace $149,407,174 - for a total price difference of
$75,082,834. Bell Aerospace bid $26.8 million for the first
ship, a total of $64.6 million (16.1 million each) for ships
#2-5, and a total of $57.9 million ($14.5 million each) for
ships #6-9.
During the period September 24 to October 2, 1984, the
Evaluation Board evaluated the responses. On October 3, 1984,
the Advisory Council was r-econvened, and an overall summary of
proposal strengths and weaknesses was presented. The Council
found that the Marinette Marine design was more fully
developed, meeting Navy performance requirements at a lower
risk, but at a much higher price. The Bell Aerospace design
presented a higher technical risk at a much lower price. Navy
concerns included the following: an SES minesweeper vessel of
this size and material had never been built, the yard had
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never used this material (and had never built a ship but were
constructing several landing craft), this material had never
been shocked tested to the U.S. Navy's strict requirements,
and the weight of the ship could be higher than estimated.
While the Bell Aerospace design met minimum performance
standards, the Council believed design changes might be
required if the design assumptions did not prove correct
during detail design.
The Navy also had some concerns with Marinette Marine. A
vessel of the size and material of their design had never been
constructed in the U.S. (although it had in Italy). In




SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SHIP ACQUISITION
As part of the background research for this thesis, many
differences were noted between ship acquisitions and other
major armed forces acquisitions. This appendix contains
special characteristics of ship acquisition as compared to
other major armed forces' acquisitions.
Ships are far more complex than other weapon systems in
termiS of size, technical complexity, missions, variety of
weapons on a single platform, and difficulty in
integration of systems.
The average time to design and build a ship is much
longer than for other weapon systems.
The average life of a ship is longer than that of most
other weapon systems.
Other weapon systems are produced in much higher numbers.
Manufacturers realize a learning curve benefits on
production of many units.
The training provided at government acquisition programs
(e.g.) DSMC is more applicable to other weapon systems
than to ships.
The amount of joint government-industry planning effort
is more for aircraft than ships. Airframe manufacturers
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have more impact on new designs than do shipyards.
When changes are made to a design or deficiencies
corrected, NAVAIR seems to have more emphasis on
centralized control and required response time than does
NAVSEA.
The number of prototypes developed and the amount of
related field testing is greater with other weapon
systems than with ships. More development is done
concurrent with construction with ships.
The government has embraced acquisition streamlining
concepts to a greater extent with planes than with ships.
More standardization is done with other weapon systems
than with ships.
More claims against the government are made by
shipbuilders than airframe manufacturers.
The Navy has a major in-house design capability for
ships; the government does not possess such a capability
for aircraft or other weapon systems.
The government seems to apply matrix management better in
aircraft than in ship acquisition.
With aircraft, the contractor has more control or choice
and interfaces concerning suppliers of equipment. With
ships the government takes greater control and supplies
more equipment.
The average cost of a prototype test with other weapon
systems is less than with vessels.
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Other weapon system manufacturers can compete in domestic
and foreign new construction commercial markets; U.S.
shipyards have the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard as
basically their only customers for new construction.
U.S. airframe manufacturers have a history of
sophisticated and extensive use of computers; shipyards
do not.
It is past and current practice to find more middle
managers with degrees in engineering in the airframe
manufacturing industry than in shipyards.
There are on the order of five to ten major airframe
manufacturers, who can compete on most new government
aircraft. The number of shipyards that can compete on a
ship order go from one (i.e. aircraft carrier) or two
(i.e. nuclear submarine) to a few dozen or more
(theoretical for a small non-combatant).
Many feel that airplanes and the airframe industry are
perceived as "new" and "modern" with the ability to
benefit from R&D funding; ships and shipyards are
perceived as mature, not being able to benefit from R&D,
particularly in the H, M & E areas.
Airframe manufacturers make much greater use of
independent research and development funds than do
shipyards .
When a U.S. government agency (e.g. Navy) proposes a
specific design, it must compete against other agencies
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(e.g. Air Force) and their designs; such is not the case
with ships.
Weather is more of a factor in ship than airframe
construe t ion
.
System integri„tion is much more difficult with ships than
other weapon systems.
Times required to correct deficiencies on ships may take
years vs. months or weeks for other weapon systems.
As compared to NAVSEA, the Canadian Unified Defense
Organization ship acquisition requires less reviews by
upper level management.
Unit price cost is much higher for ships than other
weapon systems.
Supervision of workers in shipbuilding industry is much
more difficult than with other weapon system industries.
Typically, one company will construct other weapon
systems. Additionally, the company will retain life
cycle management for the life of the weapon system.
Ships are often constructed by more than one company.
After the ship is accepted by government, government
becomes the life cycle manager.
R&D efforts are much more coordinated with other weapon
sytems than with ships.
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